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BANKRUPTCY POLICY: TOWARD A MORAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR FINANCIAL REHABILITATION
OF THE CONSUMER DEBTOR
RIcHARD E. FLNTr*
Alas for you, lawyers and Pharisees, hypocrites! ... [y]ou have
overlooked the weightier demands of the Law, justice, mercy, and
good faith. It is these you should have practiced,... Blind guides!'
The essence of our consumer bankruptcy law2 is the discharge. 3 The
discharge of a consumer debtor frees the debtor from the shackles of
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's Law School; B.A.; Ph.D.; J.D. The author
served as a bankruptcy trustee for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division
during the period 1978-84, and practiced in the area of debtors' protection and creditors'
rights during the period 1978-1988. Prior to beginning his legal career, the author was on the
faculty of the Economics Department of the University of Texas at Austin during the period
1971-74. The views expressed in this article reflect opinions developed during many years of
practical real world experience tempered by academic isolation and research.
The author wishes to express thanks and appreciation to Dean Barbara Aldave of St.
Mary's University Law School for awarding a research grant to assist the author during the
writing of this article. A special acknowledgment of appreciation also needs to be given to
Professor Gerry Beyer and my student research assistant Cecelia Cook.
1. Matthew 23:23 (The New English Bible).
2. The phrase "consumer bankruptcy" as used in this article refers to individuals who
resort to filing bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under
Chapter 7, creditors are paid from the proceeds, if any, of the liquidation of a debtor's non-
exempt assets at the time of the filing, while in Chapter 13, creditors receive payment pursuant
to a plan generally from the future income of the debtor. The bankruptcy law currently in
effect is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, as amended
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, and by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified at 11 U.S.C. and in scattered
sections of other titles). The current statute will be referred to as the "Code" and cited as
"Bankruptcy Code § ." The prior statute will be referred to as the "Act" and cited as
"Bankruptcy Act § -.
3. See Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start Policy' in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical
Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. Ricn. L. Rav. 49, 51 (1986) (stating that
"[discharge] is, rather, the principal (if not the sole) point of the exercise."); Jackson, The
Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 1393 (1985) [hereinafter Jackson,
Fresh Start Policy] (stating that principal advantage bankruptcy offers to individual is benefits
associated with discharge). Discharge represents the most significant benefit for the individual
who seeks the protection of the bankruptcy laws. Except in circumstances where the debtor
has violated a norm specified in the Code, an individual can receive a discharge of his existing
debts in exchange for giving up claims to certain non-exempt assets or a portion of his future
income. Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a), 727(a), & 1328(a). Discharge is viewed as more generous
under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7 for the reason that fewer debts are non-dischargeable
under the provisions of Chapter 13.
Although debt collection/creditor distribution is the other primary function of the bank-
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existing debt and places him on the economic treadmill once again-to earn,
consume and borrow. 4 Discharge is a substantive bankruptcy provision that
changes nonbankruptcy entitlements.' It changes the legal relationship be-
tween a debtor and his former creditor, and gives the debtor the beginnings
of a fresh start6 by immediately freeing all or a portion of his future
earnings potential ("human capital") from his past financial obligations.7
Discharge is granted to all who seek the protection of the Code upon
complying with certain conditions8 and, unless a particular debt comes
within a specified type, all debts are released. 9 This, of course, is only part
of the financial rehabilitative function of our present bankruptcy system.
The system not only frees human capital, but also provides future protection
ruptcy process, two factors greatly diminish its realization in consumer bankruptcies. Those
factors are that most Chapter 7 cases are "no-asset" and that most Chapter 13 debtors make
insignificant payments. See D. STANLYY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS AND
R MoM 20-21 (1971) (showing historically from 1946-69 over seventy percent of Chapter VII
cases were no asset); T. SLuVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
216 [fig. 12.1], 339 (1989) [hereinafter T. SULLIVAN, As WE FORGIVE] (stating that Consumer
Bankruptcy Project conducted by authors showed that two-thirds of debtors in Chapter 13
could not make their payments).
4. Although the credit industry had long touted the fact that following the filing of
bankruptcy proceedings debtors would not be able to obtain credit, this does not appear to
be the case. See CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE
UNIVERSITY, MONOGRAPH 24, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY VOL. II, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY:
CAUSES, COSTS AND BEEFITs 136 (1982) [hereinafter PrfRDUE STUDY VOL. II].
5. See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938) (stating
that bankruptcy proceedings constantly modify and affect property rights established by state
law); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (stating that "[tihe grant to
Congress [in the Constitution] involves the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and
this the States were forbidden to do.").
6. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (introducing concept of fresh
start for debtor following bankruptcy). The Court in Local Loan stated that "[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and respon-
sibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."' Id. (quoting Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)). In Local Loan the Court observed that
this "fresh start" was a response to public and private interest by permitting "the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." 292 U.S. at 244 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). The Court concluded that the provisions of the Act "are to be construed when
reasonably possible in harmony with it [the fresh start] so as to effectuate the general purpose
and policy of the act. Local rules subversive of that result cannot be accepted as controlling
the action of a federal court." Id. at 245.
7. In the case of Chapter 7 this human capital, i.e., the earnings from postfiling
employment, is freed from prefiling obligations immediately. Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6).
Under Chapter 13 the debtor will dedicate a portion of his human capital to a plan for the
repayment of his former obligations. Upon the completion of the plan, the debts are discharged
and all of his human capital is freed. Bankruptcy Code § 1328(a).
8. See Bankruptcy Code § 727(a).
9. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a), 1328(a).
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from past financial obligations' ° and allows a debtor to retain the basic
necessities of life' to continue on the treadmill. 1 2
With the continuing rise in the number of consumer bankruptcies1 3 and
the willingness of people to seek its protection 4 comes the frequent demand
of some to limit the scope and availability of debtor financial relief.'" These
10. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 524-525. These sections prevent certain types of discrimi-
nation because the protections of the Code effectively eliminate any attempts to collect
discharged debts from the debtors.
11. Bankruptcy Code § 522(b). Section 522(b) of the Code provides the debtor with a
minimum bundle of assets, commonly referred to as exempt property, upon which certain
creditors cannot levy execution.
12. All of these attributes have at different times been referred to individually and
collectively as reflecting Congressional implementation of the "fresh start policy" in the
bankruptcy law. It is through these attributes that Congress strives to obtain the goal of debtor
financial rehabilitation. Through the Code, Congress has also imposed certain limitations on
the availability and scope of debtor financial relief. It is through an understanding of the
basic values forming the justification for the fresh start policy that one can begin to "make
sense" of what appears on the surface to be conflicting and/or inconsistent goals sought to
be obtained through the implementation of the policy by Congress. See infra notes 68-125 and
accompanying text.
13. See ADmInsTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT.
This Report shows that during the 12 month period ending June 30, 1988, 594,567 petitions
were filed compared to 642,993 for the same period ending June 30, 1989; and, that during
the period 1984-89, 2,985,505 individual petitions were filed. Id. at 27 (Table 9). It is estimated
that in the year 1992, 890,000 individual cases will be filed. Smith, The Bankruptcy Boom,
U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, June 4, 1990, at 72.
14. See T. SULLIVAN, As WE FORGIVE, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that many Americans
feel there is a "growing acceptance and purported de-stigmatization" of the bankruptcy
process). Cf. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966) (noting that congressional
purpose in enacting Chapter 13 was in part to avoid the stigma of an adjudication of
bankruptcy).
15. The last changes to debtor financial relief occurred in 1984. See Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). Subtitle A of Title III of the law
was entitled the "Consumer Credit Amendments." These changes were designed to attack
certain alleged abuses in the system including extremely low payout plans under Chapter 13.
I use the phrase "alleged abuses" because few suggestions, if any, were ever made that people
abused the system as that word is generally understood. See, e.g., Ayers, Reforming the
Reform Act: Should the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Be Amended to Limit the Availability
of Discharges to Consumers?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 719, 729 (1982) (conceding that only in
rare instances might evidence show there to be serious abuse). The complaints seem to focus
on the fact that people actually used the provision of the new Code for debtor relief to the
purported detriment of the credit industry. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 16 (1983) (noting that under then-present statute courts were approving Chapter 13 plans
where debtors were "occasionally paying nothing").
The credit industry undertook an extensive campaign to "prove" that the new Code was
responsible for the increased bankruptcy filings. See Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, Laws,
Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
661, 668-70 (1988) [hereinafter Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, Real People]. The industry
also financed a major economic study to determine how much of the "losses" resulting from
bankruptcy discharge in fact could have been paid out of future earnings. See CREDrr RESEARCH
CENTER, KRANNERT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, MONOGRAPH 23, CONSUMER
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demands are often coupled with assertions that the current debtor relief
provisions do not effectuate the desired objectives of bankruptcy policy.
Thus, under this type of normative analysis the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code that implement congressional fresh start policy need to be amended
to achieve desired objectives. To evaluate analytically this normative asser-
tion, one first needs to address a more fundamental issue: What is the
central justification for financial rehabilitation of the consumer debtor? The
answer to this question goes to the very heart of our present consumer
bankruptcy process.1 6 For without a central understanding of why the process
exists, it is not logically possible to evaluate whether the goals obtained by
the implementation of that policy through legislation are justified. That is,
whether the results achieved reflect the underlying values that Congress
sought to encourage through its fresh start policy.
The interests of creditors and debtors in the bankruptcy process are
different and generally mutually inconsistent. Furthermore, due to the
alleged increases in the cost of credit for all consumers due to bankruptcy' 7
and the social costs associated with insolvency,'" society as a whole has a
BANKRUPTCY STUDY VOL. 1, CONSUMERS' RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORIGINS AND EFFECTS (1982)
[hereinafter PURDUE STUDY, VOL. I]; PURDUE STUDY, VOL. II, supra note 5. One scholar
viewed the proposed changes advocated by the consumer credit industry as a "return to the
indentured servant device ... for mass peonage, with the federal bankruptcy courts providing
free collection services for the consumer credit industry." Countryman, Bankruptcy and the
Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATI.
U. L. REv. 809, 827 (1983).
16. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing justification for financial
rehabilitation of consumer debtor). Stanley and Girth observed that:
For centuries bankruptcy laws served this object [debt collection and fair distribution
functions] above all others. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, another
object became equally important in the United States. The bankruptcy process became
also a method of granting relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor, who through ill
luck or bad judgement was burdened with more debt that he could afford.
From a creditor's perspective, the bankruptcy process is a collective system that effects
both procedural and substantive legal rights. See, e.g., Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson,
Entitlements] ("most of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned with creditor-distribution
questions.") (emphasis in original); see also Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. Rv. 815 (1987); Warren, Bankruptcy Policy,
54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1987).
17. See PURDUE STUDY, VOL. II, supra note 4, at 139 (providing that "[b]y providing a
legal method to uncouple the legally binding credit contract between the lender and borrower,
the current bankruptcy law could be expected to increase the risk and therefore the cost of
all unsecured credit.").
18. See, e.g., F. NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 187 (1919). Noel stated:
[Slociety must be seriously injured by the presence of unproductive or discontented
members, who through idleness or vicious habits may eventually become public
charges.... But public policy makes it expedient that insolvent debtors, instead of
being forever entangled by obligations as enduring as the task of Sisyphus, shall be
given a fresh start in life under the benevolent influence of the ordinary incentives
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vested interest in the bankruptcy process. 19 The failure to isolate and identify
the central justification for consumer financial rehabilitation is a serious
deficiency of legal scholarship. Instead of facing the issue head on, numerous
ad hoc approaches have been proposed to justify each respective proponent's
normative goals. ° Nevertheless, the need to develop a theoretical justification
for debtor financial relief has been recognized .2 Knowledge and acceptance
of a central justification with its underlying values can shed light on the
proper scope of the present law and aid policy makers and courts in
evaluating future bankruptcy issues.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the central justification for
the debtor financial relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is founded in
to industry and enterprise.
See generally Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access To Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis Of The Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1091, 1138-1145 [hereinafter Sullivan,
Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access].
19. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902) (stating that status of
debtor is matter of public concern). In Hanover, which is one of the leading Supreme Court
cases discussing the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, the court noted that "[tihe determination
of the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation from encumbrances on
future exertion is matter of public concern ... ." Id. (emphasis in original). One early
commentator noted that the Bankruptcy Act expressed "commercial common sense" in that
the "unfortunates, who have been in bondage to debts and judgments ... might be free
again; and the country will quickly feel the effects of the restored energy.. . ." J. BusH, TaE
NATIONAL BjAaNaurcy AcT op 1898 19 (1899) (quoting trom an article by Mr. Hotchkiss
entitled "Bankruptcy Laws, Past and Present").
20. See, e.g., Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for
Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 72-73
(1986) [hereinafter Gross, Preserving Fresh Start] (advocating a narrow construction of the
1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code); Hallinan, supra note 3, at 53 (suggesting economic
risk analysis to justify increasing use of Chapter 13); Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Oaio ST. L.J. 1047, 1069 (1987) (proposing new functional economic
theory of discharge to counter attempts to limit discharge); Jackson, Fresh Start Policy, supra
note 3, at 1394-95 (stating that use of analytical techniques from psychology to economics to
justify nonwaivability of discharge is justified by characteristic of human behavior); Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 776-78 (1983) (suggesting that
nonwaivability of discharge is paternalistic response to personality changes). Cf. T. SuuvAN,,
As WE FoRoirE, supra note 3, at 341 ("[W]e identify the centrality of the moral questions
and call for a shift in the focus of bankruptcy debates."); Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day
Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NoTRE D mE L. Rav. 165, 200 (1990)
[hereinafter Gross, Modern Day Peon] (asserting that policies relating to discharge must be
based on truths whose basis may be in philosophy, religion or social custom).
21. In 1970 the Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States for purposes of analyzing, evaluating, and redrafting the Bankruptcy Act. The
commission was to include in its study a report on the philosophy of bankruptcy. S.J. REs.
88, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). The Commission concluded that there was a lack "of either an
articulated or widely accepted policy that explains and justifies the bankruptcy process ......
REPORT OF THE CoMissIo ON TE BANKRUPTCY LAWS oF Tm UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, 62 (1973) [hereinafter CoMwIsioN REPoRT]. This conclusion
was especially true in the area of debtor financial relief. Other than statements that the purpose
of the consumer bankruptcy system was to give a "fresh start" to the debtor, apparently few
individuals had given serious attention to articulating a clear, concise, or cogent justification
for the debtor relief aspects of the Code.
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a natural law theory of morality2 2 A review of the history of bankruptcy
legislation substantiates this moral justification23 for debtor relief encom-
passing the attributes of social, 24 distributive, 25 and commutative
22. The term "natural law" as used here refers to that body of jurisprudence that
maintains a connection between law and morality free from metaphysical and theological
pretensions. See generally R. HInTnTIER, A CRTIQuE OF THE Naw NATURAL LAW THEORY
(1987). This usage conforms with the traditional definition of natural law, which refers loosely
to those moral, jurisprudential, and political theories which recognize that there are logical
and conceptual relationships between law and morality.
Natural law discourse is not without its critics. See Hittinger, Varieties of Minimalist
Natural Law Theory, 34 AM. J. Jmurs. 133 (1989) [hereinafter Hittinger, Minimalist Theory]
(providing that "[o]ne of the most persistent criticisms of natural law discourse is that it is
difficult to sort out whether the term natural law is used only as an emblematic circumlocution
for 'beliefs not currently in question,' or whether it expresses something philosophically
substantive-that is, something that might constructively guide inquiry about matters of law
and morals."). See also L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAW 102 (1964) (stating that "the term
'natural law' has been so misused on all sides that it is difficult to recapture a dispassionate
attitude toward it.").
23. The term "moral justification" as used in this article means the identification and
articulation of principles of "practical reasonableness" or "modes of responsibility" upon
which the debtor relief provisions of the Code lie. These principles or modes consist of a set
of general moral norms by reference to which various forms of unreasonableness in choosing
among human goods or values can be identified. In doing so, this article relies generally upon
the theory of natural law originally articulated by Germain Grisez and further elaborated upon
by John Finnis. J. FINis, NATURAL LAW A"D NATURAL RiGHis (1980) [hereinafter J. Fn ,
NATURAL LAW]; G. GlUsEz, Tan WAY OF Ta LORD JESUS, VOL. I, CRIsTIAN MORAL PRINCIPL.S
(1983) [hereinafter G. GaIsEz, MORAL PRiNcIP s]. The focus of their theory of natural law
is centered on an exploration of the "requirements of practical reasonableness in relation to
the good of human beings who, because they live in community with one another, are
confronted with problems of justice and rights, of authority, law and obligation." J. Ficis,
NATURAL LAW, supra, at 351. The derivation of laws and obligations in that community comes
from principles founded on reasonableness. Id. Although clearly beyond the scope of this
article, the author notes that there has been serious academic work on the relationship of
Christian ethics and the economy. See generally M. MuKS, GOD TE ECONOmiST (1989).
24. As used in this article social justice means "that persons have an obligation to be
active and productive participants in the life of society and that society has a duty to enable
them to participate in this way." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, UNITaD STATES
CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, BUnLG ECONOmIC JUSTICE: THE BisHoPs' PASTORAL Lma AND
TOOLS FOR ACTION 22 (1987) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter BISHOPS' LETTER]. The concept
of social justice also includes a duty to organize economic and social institutions so that people
can contribute to society in ways that respect their freedom and the dignity of their labor. Id.
But cf. F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY-THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976).
"[T]he phrase 'social justice' is not, as most people probably feel, an innocent expression of
good will towards the less fortunate, but that it has become a dishonest insinuation that one
ought to agree to a demand of some special interest which can give no real reason for it."
Id. at 97. Hayek's criticism of the concept of social justice is based upon the programs by
which social justice (redistribution of wealth) are achieved and the resultant weakening of the
moral principles of a free enterprise system. Id. at 99. He does not agree with the interference
that the implementation of social justice objectives has on the capitalistic system that he
propounds. However, Hayek believes that justice "in the sense of rules of just conduct"
steeped in moral principles can define legitimate constraints upon individual freedom. Id. at
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justice,26 existing in harmony as a humanitarian response to the financially
downtrodden. Thus, the focus of fresh start policy should be on the
adequacy of debtor protection, and not upon the economic or political
ramifications of that protection. 27 The moral justification for fresh start
places certain commutative justice limitations upon the distributive justice
aspects of debtor relief depending upon the actions of the debtor vis-a-vis
his creditors. These limitations place the focus of the resolution of issues
involving discharge and dischargeability on issues of fairness.
Many legal scholars are skeptical of an assertion that law can have a
moral justification 8 This skepticism has dominated some of the policy
97, 100. Thus, economic or political programs that redistribute wealth, although morally
satisfying, must, under Hayek's approach, be consistent with his conservative economic model.
25. The term "distributive justice" as used in this article requires that the economic
benefits of society be evaluated in relation to those individuals whose basic economic needs
are not met. BIsHOPS' LrMrR, supra note 24, at 22. See generally Kronman, Contract Law
and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (defending the view that positive law may
legitimately be used to redistribute wealth when private alternative methods of doing so are
likely to be more costily or intrusive).
26. As used in this article the term "commutative justice" refers to the correction or
rectification of inequalities that arise between individuals or groups and calls for fundamental
fairness in these exchanges. BISHOPS' LETER, supra note 24, at 21. See generally ADnw SmTH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTmNT 327-42 (D. Raphael & A. MacFie, eds. 1976) (originally
published in 1759) (arguing that jurisprudence from moral perspective involves examination of
actions of person who owes obligation to determine if those actions comport with "scrupulous
regard to the general rules of justice" and avoiding wronging others or violating one's own
integrity).
27. The need for adequate debtor protection has been a recurring theme in bankruptcy
jurisprudence. In an earlier attempt to formulate a bankruptcy jurisprudence one author noted
that the year of the Jewish Jubilee established the "germ of an equitable principle founded
on ethics, humanitarianism, and wise statesmanship" from which debtor relief evolved.
Hirchberg, Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 64 ALB. L.J. 232, 232 (1902). He continued by noting
that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was "emblematic of our modern civilized humanitarian
development, and of the principle that 'Justice oft must be tempered with mercy."' Id. at
239. Justice Story stated
one of the first duties of legislation, while it provides amply for the sacred obligation
of contracts, and the remedies to enforce them, certainly is, pari passu, to relieve
the unfortunate and meritorious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, which
cuts him off from a fair enjoyment of the common benefits of society, and robs
his family of the fruits of his labour, and the benefits of his paternal superintendence.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1101, 6 (1833).
28. See R. PosNER, Tan PROBLMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 348 (1990) [hereinafter R. POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE] (stating that "[ais should be clear by now, I am skeptical that moral philosophy
has much to offer law in the way of answers to specific legal questions or even in the way of
general bearings."); Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VA.. U. L. Rav. 163, 173
(1990) (suggesting that "moral discourse turns out not to provide any sort of solution [to
moral issues]. It merely provides a vocabulary in which people can express views that have
deep emotional roots. While I do not deny the force of those views and I do not deny that
government policy makers should take them into account, I do not think they are analytically
fruitful."); Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NoTR DAIM J. LAw, EmIcs & PUB.
POL'Y. 85, 103 (1985) (stating that "lilt must also be emphasized that it is apolitical philosophy
1991]
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justification debates in the area of debtor relief.29 Other scholars avoid
addressing this issue altogether and focus solely on whether the policy
achieves "desired goals."3 0 Thus, in the literature of bankruptcy policy as
it relates to debtor relieP consideration and discussion of allocation of
that I am expounding.") (emphasis in original).
H.L.A. Hart, one of the most distinguished modem legal positivists, in discussing the
methodology of focusing on the legal order as it is and not on how it ought to be stated:
"[Legal positivism] ... is not concerned with any ideal law or legal system ... its concern
with law is morally, politically and evaluatively neutral." Hart, Legal Positiveness, 4 Ency. of
Phil. 418, 419 (1967). Skeptics assert that because there is no scientific way to reduce these
moral values to a quantifiable form, their use in evaluating law is not analytically feasible.
But cf. Cohen, The Myth of Neutrality in Positive Legal Theory: Hart Revisited, 31 AM. J.
Jums. 97 (1986) (suggesting that there can be no value-neutral matrix for positive legal theory).
In any event, the same general negative attitude toward morality as a basis for legal
decision-making appears in the courts. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978). In Hill Chief Justice Burger (quoting R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, Act I,
147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)) stated: "The law, Roper, the law. I know what's
legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal.... I'm not God. The currents and
eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager.
But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester." Id. at 195 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Burger observed that he was not capable of making "fine utilitarian calculations"
or weighing any values. Id. at 187-88.
However, the lack of scientific certainty does not make a morally based approach to
resolving legal disputes any more subjective or political than any other value-laced approach.
See Malloy, Is Law and Economics Moral?-Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal
Critique of Posner's Economic Analysis, 24 VAL. U.L. Rnv. 147, 154 (1990) [hereinafter
Malloy, Is Law and Economics Moral]. Cf. R. POSNER, JUISPRUDENCE, supra, at 352 (1990)
("Indeed, weak as the methods of legal reasoning are, they are no weaker than the methods
of moral reasoning.").
"29. See Hallinan, supra note 3, at 138-43 (suggesting Bankruptcy Code has ambivalent
response to role of moral norms in formulating policy). But see Shuchman, An Attempt At
"Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. Ray. 403, 444-49 (1973) (suggesting ethical basis
for bankruptcy legislation). However, Shuchman's focus is only from the debtor-creditor
perspective. His discussion, although enlightening, focuses only on the "duty" or obligation
to repay debts and upon how to develop an ethical approach to determine which debts should
or should not be repaid. Id. at 449-58. It is a sad tribute to his intriguing article that other
scholars did not pick up his mantle and expand his ethical viewpoint to include the humanitarian
response of society to the debtor.
30. See, e.g., Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L.
Ray. 1069, 1070 (asserting that to achieve desired goal of making "debtors who are able to
repay their debts should be required to do so," Code should be amended to limit access to
Chapter 7 while encouraging access to Chapter 13). This approach is, of course, the essence
of most normative analysis. However, the uncritical use of normative analysis can, and often
does, result in an inversion of legal reasoning. In such a case the decision-maker first decides
which decision in a case establishes the desired goal, devises a rule that achieves that result,
and works backward. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. R-v. 1089, 1090 (1972) (noting
that first issue faced by legal system is to decide who is entitled to prevail). This type of
approach is contrary to critical legal analysis which involves listening to the controversy,
ascertaining the facts, and then determining which side to a controversy was supported by the
relevant body of law, whether statute or case law. See, e.g., R. Bouc, TBE TEmPTNG OF
AmERICA 262 (1990).
31. See Note, Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Code Discharge-Another case for
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risk,32 contractual impossibility, 33 insurance,3 limited liability, 35 and debtor
rehabilitation, 36 among others,37 dominate the writings s.3  The failure to
acknowledge or address the moral dimension of debtor financial relief makes
Defining the Scope of Federal Bankruptcy Law, 65 NoTE DAME L. REV. 107, 128-29 (1989)
(listing some of the same considerations that follow).
32. See Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 953, 981-82 (1981)
(suggesting that risk allocation is one of main factors underlying right of discharge). But see
Jackson, Fresh Start Policy, supra note 3, at 1398-1401 (arguing that risk allocation justification
for discharge is inadequate).
33. See, e.g., Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAw & CoNT- MP. PRoRs. (No. 4)
107, 111-12 (1977) (suggesting relationship between contract doctrine of impossibility and right
of discharge).
34. See Hallinan, supra note 3, at 100-125 (suggesting that insurance characterization is
helpful to explain nonwaivability of discharge and as response to moral hazard problem). See
also Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, Limiting Access, supra note 18, at 1142. These authors
note:
Borrowers can undertake credit commitments with the assurance that even if their
financial expectations go badly awry, there is a limit to how much they can lose.
Under current law, they cannot be sent to jail and, if they declare bankruptcy, they
cannot lose both current assets and future income. If debtors, especially marginal
debtors, pay a slightly higher interest rate because of creditors' bankruptcy risk, that
charge is their premium for the protection of bankruptcy.
(footnotes omitted).
35. See Jackson, Fresh Start Policy, supra note 3, at 1399-1401 (discussing similarity
between corporate limited liability and discharge).
36. See Howard, supra note 20, at 1069 (stating that "only the rehabilitative purpose of
restored participation in the open credit economy remains as a meaningful goal of discharge").
37. See T. JACKSON, Ta LoGic AD LIMIrs OF BANKRus'Tcy 225-52 (1986) [hereinafter
T. JACKsON, Loxc AND LIMITS] (suggesting certain volitional and cognitive justifications for
society's concern to provide safety nets through use of fresh start policy).
38. Such approaches smack of legal positivism which could be favorably compared with
Milton Friedman's positive economics. See J. HAM, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL
THEORY 14 (1958). Such approaches should be and have been rejected not only under this
author's moralistic analysis but by pragmatists and advocates of sociological jurisprudence.
See, e.g., 0. Hois, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (stating that "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.... The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics."). These approaches would also be rejected by those
who see law as an instrument of social order. See, e.g., W. FRrmEDANN, LAW IN A CEANGING
SocmYr 384 (Penguin ed. 1959) (stating, "That the content of the rule of law cannot be
determined for all time and all circumstances is a matter not for lament but for rejoicing. It
would be tragic if the law were so petrified as to be unable to respond to the unending
challenge of evolutionary or revolutionary changes in society."). The rejection of legal
positivism has found support in the area of bankruptcy policy. See, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, supra note 16, at 811-12 (stating, "I have offered a dirty, complex, elastic, intercon-
nected view of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily
fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy decision."). But see Baird, supra note 16,
at 834 (proposing that "[tihe world is a messy and complicated place, where justice is often
hard to find. But it does not follow that bankruptcy policy should be vague and mysterious
and that nothing more can be said other than that bankruptcy judges have a general mandate
to do equity, but not too much equity."); Jackson, Entitlements, supra note 16, at 907
(proposing that there is "a coherent normative theory justifying a bankruptcy system that
deals with inter-creditor questions...").
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these approaches sterile and unrealistic. There is no doubt that the acknow-
ledgment of a moral dimension to debtor financial relief introduces a
potentially subjective value-making element into the bankruptcy decision
making process. However, that same subjectivity is alive and well under
any normative approach. Many scholars are unwilling to admit that their
own value judgments permeate not only the focus, but the results of their
research.Y9 The main purpose of this article is to assist lawyers and judges
in developing an awareness of the underlying moral justification of the
debtor financial relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and to provide
them with the freedom to acknowledge and articulate the values underlying
that justification. 4°
39. Until the era of the modem law and economic scholars, economists historically have
based their models and underlying theories on acknowledged value judgments and assumptions.
Value judgments are implicit in the entire area of welfare economics because the basis of that
approach of what is a good, bad, or better result or policy is based on beliefs, views, ideas,
and opinions of the theoreticians. Furthermore, assumptions laced with values of some kind
inevitably are necessary to begin any analysis of economic behavior. John Maynard Keynes
himself identified the basic assumptions of classical economic theory and rejected them as not
being realistic. J. KEYNEs, TME GENmA THEORY OF EmpLoYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 21-
22 (1936). Keynes then proceeded to develop his own theory based on his own assumptions
concerning the behavior of people. Id. at 245-47.
Jackson's vision of the rationality of the bankruptcy laws is based upon his own concept
of conservative law and economics. Jackson, Entitlements, supra note 16, at 859-71 (explaining
that author developed "creditor's bargain" model under which most if not all creditors would
get equal priority in bankruptcy). He, like the economist from the Chicago School, believes
that the predictability of the model is more important than the validity of the assumptions.
See FkEDmAN, EssAYS ON PosInVE EcoNoMcs 3, 7-43 (1953). This approach has been flatly
rejected by other economists.
mhe doughnut of empirical correctness in a theory constitutes its worth, while its
hole of untruth constitutes its weakness. I regard it as a monstrous perversion of
science to claim that a theory is all the better for its shortcomings; and I notice that
in the luckier exact sciences, no one dreams of making such a claim.
Samuelson, Theory and Realism: A Reply, 54 Am. ECON. R-v. 736 (1964) (emphasis deleted).
40. Another scholar has recognized the need to develop this awareness in the area of
bankruptcy law. Gross, Modern Day Peon, supra note 20, at 200. Gross observes that "the
policies relating to bankruptcy discharge cannot simply be a matter of instrumental reasoning.
Instead, the discharge policy must be based upon non-instrumental (deontological) truths."
Id. Gross continues by suggesting that a model for the study of bankruptcy should identify
the underlying social, religious, or philosophical values, which she unfortunately fails identify
or discuss. Id. Cf. R. DwogiNxm, TAxPNG RiGs SERiousLY 67 (1977) ("If a theory of law is
to provide a basis for judicial duty, then the principles it sets out must try to justify the
settled rules by identifying the political or moral concerns and traditions of the community
which, in the opinion of the lawyer whose theory it is, do in fact support the rules. This
process of justification must carry the lawyer very deep into political and moral theory .. ")
(emphasis in original); Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. Ray. 165 (1982)
(stating that "[according to naturalism, judges should decide hard cases by interpreting the
political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find
the best justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a
whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for
example, the private law of tort or contract.") (emphasis in original); Gross, Preserving Fresh
Start, supra note 20, at 72 (stating that article was attempt to "provide practical interpretive
guidance to aid courts and lawyers" in a narrow construction of the Consumer Credit
Amendments).
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The moralistic view of debtor financial relief is drastically different and
inconsistent with the conservative law and economic approach to the subject,
as the emphasis or focus is on the moral dimension of the interaction
between debtors and creditors in the community, and not on the efficient
allocation of resources by self-serving people in a competitive marketplace. 41
The moral approach stresses that human dignity is of a higher value than
the economic benefits or costs associated with achieving a desired economic
result. 42 The moralistic view of debtor relief also differs from the view of
modem positivist and critical legal studies proponents who consider any
normative approach to the law as indeterminate, and prefer instead to assert
41. Under the conservative law and economics approach, "the idea of a public morality
once again becomes untenable because values are transformed into preferences and each
preference is assumed to have an equal claim to satisfaction." Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72
Cou u.L L. Rnv. 1, 14 (1986). Judge Posner notes that efficiency is not the only social value
that governments should consider, but is the only value that courts can promote. R. PosNmR,
ECoNoMc ANALYsIs OF LAW 23 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. PosaR, ECONoMc ANALYsis].
But see A. ETmoM, THE MORAL DamNsloN: TOWARD A NEw ECONOMC 22 (1988) (stressing
need for law and economics scholarship to expand their classical paradigm to include moral
considerations.); Malloy, Is Law and Economics Moral?, supra note 28, at 160 (stating that
"[w]hile economics, capitalism, and democracy are all important factors in helping us under-
stand and promote human dignity, we cannot escape our own personal moral obligation to
make each of these factors subservient to the higher values they can promote-freedom,
liberty, and human dignity."). This author does not mean to imply that economics is not
helpful in answering normative questions. However, its use should be limited to what economics
does best. Economists can help organize facts and use statistical analysis to assist in determining
if a policy implemented by Congress in fact is obtaining its desired goals. Economic theories
can be used to illustrate and illuminate policy issues, but should not be used as the sole source
to resolve those issues. "People are too complex, and competing considerations too important,
to rest everything on theory, no matter how fervently supported." Milstein, Economics: Use
and Misuse-A Response to Professor Areeda, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 539, 550 (1983). See also
Seita, Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 993, 1032-33
(discussing "proper" role of economics in law). See generally R. MALLoY, LAW AND ECONOMics:
A ComPAxATIvE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-4 (1990) [hereinafter R. MAUoY, LAW
.n EcONOmCs] (differentiating between economic analysis of law and the study of law and
economics). .
42. The issue of whether economic analysis can effectively evaluate the costs and benefits
of our present bankruptcy system, or for that matter any proposed changes to that system,
has been the subject of constant debate. See, e.g., Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and
Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CoNTEmP. PRODS. (No. 4) 13 (1977) (suggesting
that economic principles can provide "an analytical framework.within which to clarify issues,
identify more precisely the role which bankruptcy plays, and access the social consequences of
alternative structures for bankruptcy"). But see Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy:
The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAW & CoNrmAp. PRoDs. (No. 4) 66, 68 (1977) (noting the lack of
empirical information to effectively evaluate the issue). More recently the use of empirical
verification of the simplistic economic model of the Purdue Study has come under attack. See
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Real People, supra note 15, at 673 (stating that "[t]hese data
[compiled by the authors in their Consumer Bankruptcy Project] suggest to us that the relatively
simplistic economic models used in bankruptcy policymaking do not work, a conclusion we
believe has relevance in other areas where a simple new model promises to revolutionize
policymaking.").
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that law is political. 43 However, the moral approach suggested in this article
is closely associated with the actual historical development of debtors'
protection in this country" and with the fundamental precepts underlying
the formation of our nation.45
This article first will examine the moral justification for the debtor
financial relief provisions of the Code. This portion of the article will
discuss the various attributes of debtor financial relief and develop a
meaningful moral justification for those attributes. In doing so, this article
will attempt to defuse the arguments of those critics of natural law who
assert that the natural law method is not a useful process for lawyers or
judges because the result of such a method depends merely on one's
perspective or individual moral values. By stressing that the law reflects
reason and conscience, this article should convince even the skeptic that
fundamental principles of fairness and humanitarianism form the moral
dimension of the debtor relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The end
of the first part of this article will review the history of bankruptcy legislation
and review judicial decisions to establish that historically the bankruptcy
process is and has been a reflection and recognition of the moral fiber of
the nation. The second and third parts of this article will apply this developed
moral justification to a proposed resolution of two currently unanswered
issues involving consumer debtors. These issues involve the lien avoidance
power of the debtor and the standard of proof in dischargeability cases."
43. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BturALo L. Rnv. 209,
211 (1979). See also Fiss, supra note 41, at 14 (stating that both critical legal studies approach
and law and economics approach "start from a rejection of law as an embodiment of public
morality and thus have a common base line").
44. See infra notes 125-81 and accompanying text; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
667-80 (1970) (recognizing that courts frequently have used history in constitutional interpre-
tation of laws). See also Address by Justice J.P. Stevens, Thomas E. Fairchild Inaugural
Lecture at the University of Wisconsin (Sept. 9, 1988) (available from the Public Information
Office of the Supreme Court of the United States). There Justice Stevens noted:
A judge's use of history must involve more than a search for isolated items of
information. A historical inquiry has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension.
The isolated fact must be studied in its contemporary setting, as well as in relation
to what may have preceded or followed. For history, like law and life itself, involves
a process of change, of growth, and of improvement.
Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted).
45. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46. At the time of this writing the Supreme Court has recently decided the questions of
the proper standard of proof in dischargeability cases, Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654
(1991) (holding after fair balance of conflicting interests of complete fresh start and creditors'
interest in recovering full payment of certain nondischargeable debts that preponderance of
evidence standard applies under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)), and is considering the validity of state
lien conservation statutes in light of the Code's provision for lien avoidance on exempt
property, In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Owen v. Owen,
110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990).
On May 29, 1990 the Supreme Court held that restitution orders are dischargeable debts
in proceedings under Chapter 13. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S.
Ct. 2126, 2134 (1990). In doing so the court distinguished an earlier decision, Kelly v. Robinson,
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TOWARD A MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DEBTOR FINANIL RELIEF
Prior to 1787 the relationship of an insolvent debtor and his creditors
rested in the hands of the individual states.4 7 However, the Constitution
changed this by expressly granting to Congress the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."4 8 In response to such authority, Congress has generated five separate
statutes on the subject.4 9 True to the Madisonian ideal, 50 each of these
legislative enactments has provided some form of debtor financial relief"
to deal with a fundamental problem inherent in any credit economy where
individuals are free to make and often do make poor economic decisions.
52
479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986), which held that restitution obligations imposed as conditions of
probation in state criminal actions are nondischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 7. Id.
at 2129. Although the "result" in Davenport is consistent with the moralistic justification for
debtor relief provisions developed in this article, it is extremely disappointing that the Court
did not mention any policy justifications for its decision. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at
139 (stating that "[c]ourts should use [clear and coherent] analysis of fundamental goals and
policies to resolve all issues requiring definition of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code.").
47. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 27, § 1098, at 1 (noting that under Articles of Confed-
eration individual states possessed exclusive right to pass laws upon subject of bankruptcy and
insolvency); F. NoEL, supra note 18, at 33-66 (discussing types of insolvency and bankruptcy
laws of colonies and states prior to Constitution).
48. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
49. The first statue was the Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 [hereinafter 1800
Act], repealed by the Act of December 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. The second was the Act
of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 [hereinafter 1841 Act], repealed less than two years
later by the Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. The third was the Act of March 2,
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 [hereinafter 1867 Act], repealed by the Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
169, 20 Stat. 99. The next act was the Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Act], repealed and replaced by the same act of Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2549 which
took effect on October 1, 1979 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
50. See Tan FEDERAL=r No. 42, at 277-78 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). In
discussing the proposed constitutional provision, James Madison emphasized its breadth by
recognizing that it provided relief from debt, prevention of fraud, and uniformity in application.
The issue of uniformity in light of conflicting state laws or the absence of federal legislation
and the imperfect distinction between insolvency laws and bankruptcy laws dominated the
early discussions and judicial decisions. See F. NOEL, supra note 18, at 100; Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 194-95 (1819) (discussing difficulties in discriminating
between insolvency and bankruptcy laws).
51. See infra notes 125-81 and accompanying text (discussing in detail early bankruptcy
acts as well as Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Code). The 1800 Act provided only for
involuntary proceedings [Section 2, 2 Stat. 21] and permitted discharge only upon the written
consent of two-thirds, in number and value, of creditors. Section 36, 2 Stat. 31. Section 4 of
the 1841 Act provided for discharge of the voluntary and involuntary debtor unless a "majority
in number and value of his creditors" filed written objections. 5 Stat. 443. Section 29 of the
1867 Act (as originally enacted and before amendment) permitted discharge in voluntary and
involuntary cases without creditor consent. 14 Stat. 531-32.
52. The problems generated by debt in a contract-based -credit economy was well
documented by the House Report that accompanied H.R. 8200 (95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977)),
which after Senate amendments, became the Bankruptcy Code. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1977) [hereinafter HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADM. NEWS at 5965. This same fact was also acknowledged by an earlier Congress: "The
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Each debtor relief statute has had economic and political ramifications, but
each also has had a moral dimension that frequently has been overlooked
by modern commentators."
foundation of loan is trust, wherever securities are not taken; it is confidence; it is credit-all
terms which imply risk, and the possibility of failure. The risk relates to the question of
solvency or insolvency when the period comes for demanding payment." H.R. REP. No. 5,
27th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1841).
53. Early commentators steeped in natural law tradition were no stranger to the moral
dimension of bankruptcy legislation. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 27, § 1101, at 3. According
to Story,
[W]hen the debtors have no property, or have yielded up the whole to their creditors,
to allow the latter at their mere pleasure to imprison them, is a refinement in cruelty,
and an indulgence of private passions, which could hardly find apology in an
enlightened despotism; ... It is incompatible with the first precepts of Christianity;
and is a living reproach to the nations of christendom.
However, more recently, little academic scholarship has been devoted to an ontological
or deontological analysis of these issues. This lack of scholarship could at one time been the
result of the rejection of the natural law hypothesis and the development of legal positivism.
However, with the resurgence of new secular natural law it is surprising that this issue has
not been a focal point of discussion. In spite of this resurgence, the answer may be that
secular moral philosophy has no objective foundation. See J. MAcKrE, ETmcs-INvmN~No
RIoHT AND WRONG 19 (1977) (noting that moral philosophy has been relegated to addressing
linguistic or conceptual questions, and that its failure to address questions in ontological terms
has lead to skepticism); A. MAcINYRE, AFTER ViRTuE 235 (1981) (noting that "[m]oral
philosophy, as it is dominantly understood, reflects the debates and disagreements of the
culture so faithfully that its controversies turn out to be unsettlable in just the way that the
political and moral debates themselves are."); G. WARNOCK, Co nMPoRARY MORAL PatLos-
oPiY 1 (1967) (stating that moral philosophy of twentieth century England is barren).
Some philosophers have argued that secular moral philosophy is doomed because it
contains no real authority. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1229, 1249 ("To put it concisely, if the applicable God is going to insist upon being incoherent,
we really have no choice but to be arbitrary."). J.L. Mackie, a modern moral skeptic, argues
that morality still is essential for the maintenance of community life and that the fiction of
its objectively authoritative hold over us therefore should be perpetuated for prudential reasons.
J. MAcKiE, supra, at 239. Mackie describes his theory as "what we can make of morality
without recourse to God, and hence of what we can say about morality if, in the end, we
dispense with religious belief." Id. at 48. If no secular moral theory has authority to control
human action, one could turn to religious beliefs to provide that authority. See Constable, A
Criticism of "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends" By Grisez, Boyle, and
Finnis, 34 Am. J. Jusus. 19, 22 (1989); Goldsworthy, God or MacKie? The Dilemma of Secular
Moral Philosophy, 30 AM. J. JuuRs. 43 (1985). The problems of secular moral philosophy
alluded to above are not any different from those facing other social sciences where value
judgments must be made. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 422-44 (1981) (listing some of value choices implicit in
economic analysis of law as practiced); R. MAuoy, LAw AND EcONOMCS, supra note 41, at
60-101 (comparing values and assumptions of various ideological approaches to law and
economics). The fact that values judgments are implicit in moral philosophy should not deter
one from asserting that moral philosophy can be useful in resolving issues in the legal realm.
See Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1152 (positing that moral judgments may
in fact be objective). Thus, the response to the moral skeptic should be like that of Cassius
to Brutus: "[tlhe fault, dear Brutus is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings."
W. SHAKEsPEARE, JuLrus CAEsAR, Act I, Scene II (Mabie ed. 1905).
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The soul of debtor financial relief, the fresh start, is found in the
availability of a discharge and in the protection of exempt property.54
Together these attributes can be viewed as a unified system whose focus is
on the debtor and his future as a living, breathing person. Debtor financial
relief should be considered a separate and distinct policy objective of
Congress which should not be intertwined with the policies relating to the
creditor-oriented debt collection and distribution function of the law.55
Debtor financial relief is an ethical and moral response to the inevitable
inability to pay debt. 6 Such a response stands as a beacon in a long history
of Anglo-American responses to debtor financial default, which has ranged
from death to imprisonment.57
There is no doubt that the concept of a fresh start policy can be viewed
as ambiguous. Fresh start in comparison to what? Fresh start comprised of
what? The concept of fresh start is centered on debt forgiveness." Any
54. Although the Code generally leaves this protection to nonbankruptcy law, the goal
of fresh start found in the Code would be incomplete without understanding the role of
exemptions in the overall justification for the fresh start. This approach to bankruptcy fresh
start policy differs from that of Professor Jackson who states that "bankruptcy's fresh start
policy is largely limited to the protection of human capital." T. JACKSON, Loaic AND LImiTS,
supra note 37, at 228 (emphasis omitted). However, by developing a moral justification for
debtor financial relief, it will become clear that the underlying values for permitting a debtor
to retain exempt property are interrelated to the values that are inherent in discharge. A
separation of the basic purposes for exemptions and discharge in developing a justification
for debtor financial relief distorts the ability to develop a coherent and logical approach.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (noting that "Professor
MacLachlan has said that the development of the discharge 'represents an independent ...
public policy in favor of extricating an insolvent debtor from what would otherwise be a
financial impasse'.") (citation and footnote omitted). Cf. Jackson, Fresh Start Policy, supra
note 3, at 1395-96 (stating that "[d]ischarge, which is available only to individuals, could be
granted without a collective proceeding, just as a collective proceeding for parceling out existing
assets could be provided without discharge:") (footnotes omitted).
Even though the moral justification for debtor financial relief does not focus on the
concerns of creditors, per se, debtor financial relief clearly has an impact upon creditor debt
collecting ability. But decisions concerning the scope and availability of debtor relief should
be totally independent of their economic impact on debt collection.
56. See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the
Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEG. HIST. 153, 157-59 (1982); Levinthal, The
Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 5 (1919); Levinthal, The Early
History of Bankruptcy, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 229 (1918) [hereinafter Levinthal, Early
History]. But cf. Deuteronomy 15:1-3 (discussing existence of periodic release for debt under
Mosaic law). Discharge is not generally available in other legal systems. See J. DALIUmmSEN,
DALnnnsEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY § 1.0711] (1986) (discussing
continental legal systems).
However, the concept of discharge is not new. During the reign of Queen Anne the
concept entered the English law.' 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705). The intent for such legislation has
been viewed as an incentive for the debtor to cooperate with his creditors. Cohen, supra, at
156-57. Some form of discharge has been a part of every bankruptcy statute in American,
although the scope has varied. See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY (1935) (hereinafter C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY HISTORY).
58. By putting the result in these stark terms one can easily see that developing a moral
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system that gives creditors access to any of the assets of the debtor, or
which would not discharge all debts, would surely detract from a policy of
an absolute fresh start.5 9 Should fresh start protect only those debtors who
suffer some unavoidable or unexpected financial reversal leading to insol-
vency? Should it protect debtors who incorrectly predict their outlays and
their income? Or, should it be broader and protect any debtor who seeks
refuge under the law? In spite of these apparent ambiguities, the scholarly
approach should not be to disregard this concept as inadequate,w° but to
recognize that this term is merely a shorthand rendition for the underlying
values which encompass the congressional justification for debtor financial
relief. The task then should be to focus on a determination of what that
justification is and what values are reflected in the legislative implementation
of the fresh start policy. In approaching this task, the inability, or perhaps
the unwillingness, of most courts or lawyers to address legal issues in ethical
or moral terms6' has impeded the achievement of the objectives of the fresh
justification for the process is a reasonable way to approach the problem. But see H. ARENDT,
THE HUMAN Co~NrroN 243 (1958) ("forgiving ... has always been deemed unrealistic and
inadmissible in the public realm.").
59. On the other hand, fewer limitations on discharge arguably can create a "head
start." See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
accrued vacation pay was property of bankrupt estate and that Court's decision holding to
contrary gave "head start").
60. But see Howard, supra note 20, at 1048 (arguing that fresh start formulation does
not specify the goals of bankruptcy sufficiently to distinguish debts and debtors that should
be discharged from those that should not). This statement can be viewed as reflecting the
author's misunderstanding of the fresh start policy. The Congressional purpose behind the
fresh start policy is to obtain debtor financial relief. Discharge and exemptions are statutory
methods adopted by Congress to implement that policy and are designed to attain certain
goals, i.e., financial rehabilitation through the freeing of human capital and protection of the
debtor and his family, among others. A justification for the fresh start policy should reflect
the values that Congress was seeking to achieve or promote through the implementation of its
policy. Thus, if the goals attained by the policy are ones which support the inherent values
of the policy, there is a justification.
As seen in this light, the problem is not in the phrase "fresh start," but in the failure
of commentators and courts to acknowledge the central moral justification for the fresh start
policy and the values inherent in that policy. The failure to make such an acknowledgment is
apparent in their writings. Howard, for example, notes five different and allegedly mutually
inconsistent policies that justify isolated aspects of the Code's discharge rule. Id. at 1048.
Hallinan states that there is a need to integrate the "disparate strands of the 'fresh start' into
a coherent and integrated account of the debtor-relief objectives of bankruptcy as they exist
under the Code." Hallinan, supra note 3, at 97.
61. See Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 539 (1989). Professor Rice eloquently notes that:
a wider recognition of the natural law as part of the law of God would serve as an
incentive to the enactment of just laws as well as a brake on the enactment of unjust
ones. However, arguments based on the natural law and the divine law will have
little effect in a society that recognizes neither. It is not enough to argue the natural
law case in academic terms. A restoration of societal respect for that law and for
the divine law-a conversion-is needed before the natural law case will prevail in
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start policy. It is time, however, to get serious about fresh start.
Any normative justification for debtor financial relief needs to explain,
in terms of the values underlying the policy, the reasons for the protection
of human capital, or, for that matter, the protection of any assets of the
debtor. In addition, the normative justification for debtor financial relief
needs to differentiate logically between the alienability of exemptions and
the inalienability of the right to discharge. 62 Finally, such an approach must
explain the circumstances under which an individual may lose his right to
discharge, 63 or may lose that right with respect to a particular debt. 64 The
moral justification for debtor financial relief 65 has historical support and
offers a satisfactory explanation for these as well as other questions. 66 This
article now turns to these tasks.
Development of a Moral Justification for Debtor Financial Relief
The moral dimension of debtor relief has two separate but related
facets. The first concerns the community's commitment to a debtor; 67 the
second involves a debtor's commitment to his community. 6 An understanding
the public arena.
Id. at 569. Cf. Berman, The Crisis of Legal Education in America, 26 B.C.L. Rnv. 347, 348
(1985) (stating that " [o]nly the past two generations, in my lifetime, has the public philosophy
of America shifted radically from a religious to a secular theory of law .... ").
62. See Bankruptcy Code § 524(a) (stating that discharge cannot be waived). Under
Sections 522(e) and (f), waivers of exemptions in exempt property are limited.
63. See Bankruptcy Code § 727(a) (listing situations when court shall deny discharge).
64. See Bankruptcy Code § 523(a) (listing nondischargeable debts).
65. Bankruptcy offers only financial relief for the individual debtor and, therefore, can
be viewed as offering only one cog in the social policies of our country to promote social
justice along with medicare and social security, among others. The process provides no debt
counseling or consumer education to assist the individual from falling into the same economic
trap. Furthermore, it does not prevent the imposition of criminal prison sanctions. See
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2134 (1990) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the effect of the Court's holding (that restitution
obligations were debts under the Code and dischargeable under Chapter 13) might force
sentencing courts to impose a harsher and less appropriate term of imprisonment, "a sentence
that the federal bankruptcy courts will be unable to undermine." Id. at 2138.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 125-81.
67. Little academic scholarship has discussed this fundamental principle intrinsic to the
bankruptcy process. In one of the few recent discussions of a potential moral dimension of
fresh start policy the focus lay only on the debtor's moral obligation to pay his creditors. See
Hallinan, supra note 3, at 138-43 According to Halinan, "Moral judgments may provide a
basis for creating or increasing incentives to avoid particular conduct, but it is the existence
and quality of the incentives, rather than the moral judgment, that determines the availability
of relief." Id. at 139. Although acknowledging an "undeniable rhetorical significance" of the
language of moral rights, Hallinan rejects moral norms as an explanation for the fresh start
policy because he finds it incompatible with his "economic approach". Id. at 141-43. See also
Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BA.xR. L.J. 355, 371 (1986) (stating
that policies underlying discharge provide little support or contradiction for notion that
independent moral obligation to pay one's debts may exist).
68. These commitments are mutually interdependent, as the community is but the sum
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of the moral dimension of debtor financial relief can lead to a natural law
method for developing a moral justification for the debtor financial relief
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Natural law method is a decision-
making process relying first on the use of practical reason to develop a
field of choices among a field of human goods or values. Then, the method
uses moral principles to assist in the choosing among those goods or values. 69
Moral reasoning requires that in giving a justification, an individual must
connect descriptions of that conduct with a principle or value, that is, the
ultimate reason for the action.
Asserting that there is a moral justification7° for the debtor financial
relief provisions of the Code means that it is completely reasonable for
Congress to legislate conditions for the forgiveness of debt between auton-
omous individuals. 7 ' The use of the term "reasonable" signifies that our
of all its individuals. Thus, the community's well-being is enhanced by the individual well-
being of all its members just as the communities well-being is diminished if the well-being of
any of its members is diminished. The common good is not just the greatest net good under
a utilitarian theory. But see Shuchman, supra note 29, at 410 (suggesting that "the purpose
of this body of law [bankruptcy] ought ... to be the accomplishment of as much good and
as much utility as possible .... ).
The focus should be not on the "size of the pie," but on the equitable distribution of
that pie among the members of the community. Institutions, or for that matter laws, exist for
individuals in the community, and an individual should not be harmed so that others may
prosper or so that the system may work. The grounding of this common good can be in
God's intentions, or, under the approach presented in this article, the use of the principles of
practical reasonableness. "The ideal of integral human fulfillment is that of a single system
in which all the goods of human persons would contribute to the fulfillment of the whole
community of persons." G. GiusEz, MoRAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 23, at 185. The idea of
common good however is not the fulfillment of the community's goals, but is "fundamentally
the good of individuals (an aspect of whose good is friendship in the community)." J. Fn;is,
NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 168; G. Gmsz, MoRAL PRIn.csIPs, supra note 23, at 270-
73.
69. J. Fncms, NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 23. Any theory of natural law "undertakes
a critique of practical viewpoints, in order to distinguish the practically unreasonable from the
practically reasonable .... [It] claims to be able to identify conditions and principles of
practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among men and in individual conduct."
Id. at 18. Moral principles are those principles concerned with the establishment and mainte-
nance of proper social relations among persons with respect to the basic human goods or
values. Id. The supposed authority of these human goods can come from religious beliefs. G.
Gisz, MoRAL PRiNcIPLas, supra note 23, at 134-35,
70. The use of reason is required to translate the natural inclinations to obtain human
ends into practical decisions and actions. It is in the making of these decisions and in the
offering of justifications for them that one enters into the realm of morals. See H. ARKs,
FIRST TmNos 13 (1986). See Hittinger, Minimalist Theory, supra note 22, at 141-42 (1989).
Finnis and Grisez refer to these as basic human goods. J. Fncms, NATURAL LAW, supra note
23, at 85-90; G. GiusEz & R. SHAw, BEYOND TBE NEW MoRALrY 79-83 (3rd ed. 1988)
[hereinafter G. GRISEZ, NEw MoRAsrr).
71. By asserting that the present system has a moral justification does not mean that
another system also may not be morally justifiable. Assuming that another scheme satisfies
the conditions as detailed below, it also may satisfy the natural law method of being reasonable.
The analysis that follows is, thus, a positive approach to the existing statutory scheme. A
normative approach suggesting legislative changes hopefully will be the subject of further
research by other academicians.
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present system, which frees human capital, provides for exemptions, and
imposes certain limitations upon discharge and dischargeability, is consistent
with the fulfillment of the common goocd under the principles of the natural
law method originally pronounced by Saint Thomas Aquinas. 72 Under the
approach of Aquinas natural law is a rule of reason for the common good,
made by God and intrinsic in man, which provides a ground for decision
and action. Human law, which is derived from natural law, is an integral
part of God's plan and is designed to promote the common good and help
man achieve his highest good. Recently, Germain G. Grisez and John Finnis
have expanded and restated Aquinas' natural law method.7 3
One of the central features of the Grisez-Finnis moral theory is "its
account of ultimate reasons for action. ' 74 That is, that the ultimate reason
for human action must be made in reference to some intrinsic human good
72. The approach taken in this article is similar to the approach of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, who postulated that the way to discover what was morally right was to investigate
what was reasonable. "[Mian's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be
against reason... ." T. AQuxmAs, SummA THEOOGICA I-II q. 71, a. 2 (Benziger Brothers ed.
1947). See also G. G(isaz, NEw MoRAsTry, supra note 70, at 97 (stating that "[tlo be morally
good is to be completely reasonable, to be morally bad is to be somewhat less than completely
reasonable.") (emphasis in original). Law as defined by Aquinas is "an ordinance of reason
for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated." T.
AQurNAs, supra, at I-I, q. 90, a. 4. Law is a directive for activity which presupposes a choice
which must itself be in accord with moral principles if the directive is to be law with moral
force. Id. at I-Il, q. 96, a. 4. Thus, for Aquinas all law (Aquinas distinguishes four types of
law: eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law (Id. at I-II, q. 91, a. 1-a. 4)) must
have a moral foundation. Id. at I-I, q. 93, a. 3. Id. at I-II, q. 90, a. 1. Aquinas states that
the basic principles of natural law are "instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally." Id. at I-I1, q. 90 a. 4. For a more detailed discussion and explanation of Aquinas'
Treatise of Law, see L. Wanmii, NAarutAL LAW AND JusTICE 53-63 (1987); Rice, supra note
61, at 558-66.
73. See J. Fnwis, NATURAL LAw, supra note 23; G. Gisaz, MoRA PRI~cn's~s, supra
note 23; G. GRisEz, NEw Moa=ty, supra note 70. Grisez acknowledges his difference from
other interpreters of Aquinas by asserting that the first precept of natural law ("good is to
be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided") does not refer to a moral imperative but
refers only to the manner by which one chooses between human goods or values. Grisez, The
First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94,
Article 2, 10 NAT. L.F. 168, 200 (1965). Grisez asserts that the "principle is not an imperative
demanding morally good action.... [p]recisely because the first principle does not specify the
direction of human action, it is not a premise in practical reasoning; other principles are
required to determine direction." Id. Finnis acknowledges that his ethical theory is "squarely
based" upon Grisez. J. Fmis, NATuRAX LAW, supra, at vii [hereinafter this theory will be
referred to as the Grisez-Finnis approach].
This interpretation of Aquinas has been attacked as a total misstatement or misunder-
standing of Aquinas' position. See R. HrrrN-GER, supra note 22, at 30-39. Hittinger asserts
that Grisez is not being true to the Thomistic texts and only wants to create his own version
of a system of natural law founded on two separate components: a first principle of practical
reason, which guides practical reason in a premoral state; and a first principle of morality
which stipulate the specific moral principles of choice. See Hittinger, Minimalist Theory, supra
note 22, at 159-61.
74. George, Recent Criticisms of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 1371, 1407
(1990).
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or value 5 that renders the choice intelligible, having some purpose. The
first principle of practical reason-that good should be done76 -guides action
by reference to moral norms" that provide a standard for fully reasonable
choices compatible with individual human fulfillment.78 The essence of this
75. In his work, Grisez explains that the term "human goods" does not mean property
or other things extrinsic to persons, but are aspects of the person himself. His list of goods
includes: self-integration, practical reasonableness, authenticity, justice, friendship, religion,
knowledge, appreciation for beauty, and play. G. GisEz, MoRAL Pcin ~cn'.s, supra note 23,
at 123-24. Finnis categorizes the basic human goods or values as: life (and health), knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion. J.
Fwrms, NATuRAL LAW, supra note 23, at 85-90. These goods are intrinsic and are the reasonable
basis for action. See George, supra note 74, at 1392. In his article George gives a rather
detailed illustration of the chain of practical reason that traces back to an ultimate good or
value. Id. at 1390-94. .1
76. T. AQuNAs, supra note 72, at I-II, q(. 94, a. 2 (according to Aquinas, natural law
is directed to common good through first principle of natural law: "[G]ood is to be done and
pursued, and evil is to be avoided."). Grisez and Finnis refer to this as the first principle of
practical reasonableness. See J. Fnuis, NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 100; G. Grszz,
MoRAL Psi.ciPxs, supra note 23, at 178. Under the Grisez-Finnis theory even an immoral
act can respond to this principle.
Even morally bad actions have their point. One chooses to do what is morally wrong
for some reason, and like any other deliberate action, the reason for which one acts
immorally must ultimately be reduced to the basic goods. So far forth, even an
immoral act responds to the first principle: Good is to be done and pursued.
Grisez, Boyle, & Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J.
Ju is. 99, 121 (1987) [hereinafter Grisez, Boyle, & Finnis, Moral Truth]. But see Hittinger,
Minimalist Theory, supra note 22, at 160 (noting that if Grisez and Finais had not dropped
second part of principle-that evil is to be avoided-it would have been "senseless" to speak
of this principle as premoral).
77. Because the first practical principle does not state a moral principle, Grisez and
Finnis develop the first principle of morality by which persons are enjoined to "choose and
otherwise will [choose] those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a
will toward integral human fulfillment." Grisez, Boyle, & Finnis, Moral Truths, supra note
76, at 128. "The ideal of integral human fulfillment is that of a single system in which all
the goods of human persons would contribute to the fulfillment of the whole community of
persons." G. G~isrz, MoRAL PRiNcn'LEs, supra note 23, at 185. It is not the individual
satisfaction of desires that is the ultimate goal, but the realization of all the human goods in
the whole of human community. They postulate eight moral i rinciples to structure and guide
human choices between intelligible human goods to achieve ultimate human fulfillment. Finais
labels these "requirements of practical reasonableness." J. F N Ns, NATURAL LAW, supra note
23, at 100-127. Grisez refers to these principles as the "modes of responsibility." G. GmsEz,
Naw MORA=iTY, supra note 70, at 117-39 These requirements constitute a natural law method
by giving the "sorts of reasons why (and thus the ways in which) there are things that morally
ought (not) to be done." J. Fn;Ns, NATURAL LAW, supra, at 103. These principles "specify
the ways of choosing and acting which are incompatible with respect for and service of the
goods." G. GRisaz, NEW MoRAurry, supra, at 118. It is through the interrelationship of these
moral principles and the first principle of natural law that human choices and actions are
guided in respect to intrinsic human goods. Id. Under their theory, although not all the modes
are equally important, "[mloral goodness means service of all the human goods and observance
of all the modes." Id. at 127.
78. See G. GRisEz, NEw MoRALiTY, supra note 70, at 103-04 (noting that first principle
of morality under Grisez-Finnis theory refers to ideal of integral human fulfillment). Our
THE MORALITY OF DEBTOR RELIEF
approach in evaluating positive law, such as the Bankruptcy Code, is:
whether the law provides for basic human goods or values determined under
requirements of practical reasonableness, and whether the process of choos-
ing between the various human goods or values was done in a manner
consistent with integral community fulfillment.7 9 If these requirements are
fulfilled, the law is morally justified, or "reasonable. s"80
Given this basic overview of the Grisez-Finnis moral philosophy, one
can apply the natural law method to develop a moral justification for debtor
financial relief. This application requires the resolution of the following
questions: What values or human needs are being protected by the law?
Are the provisions of the law consistent with the application of the require-
ments of practical reasonableness? Does the Code assist the nation in moving
toward social justice for all members, individually, and collectively as a
society? 8'
knowledge of this ideal comes from practical reason, but it cannot be achieved by human
choices. However, as noted by George, the norms derived from the first principle of morality
direct our choices to things that can be done. "We cannot choose to bring about integral
human fulfillment, but we can choose compatibility with a will to integral human fulfillment."
George, supra note 74, at 1420.
79. According to Finnis a positive regulatory law like the Bankruptcy Code should be
grounded in principles of practical reasonableness (moral principles) and should give "due
respect for the human rights which embody the requirements of justice, and for the purpose
of promoting a common good in which such respect for rights is a component." J. Fm'ns,
NATURAL LAw, supra note 23, at 23. Finals illustrates his requirement of justice by using the
English Bankruptcy Law as an example. Id. at 188-93. The purpose of his approach is to first
identify human goods that can be secured only through institutions of human law. Id. at 3.
Then he uses the requirements of practical reasonableness to determine if that human law is
justified in the manner that it approaches the attainment of human goods. Id.
80. While the majority of the work of German Grisez is centered in the moral philosophy
for individual choice, Grisez does realize that in evaluating social structures and policies (which
is the goal of this article), the issue of the common good arises. "When one speaks of the
common good as a moral principle, one is speaking, from a communal perspective, of the
basic human goods, while the social morality flowing from this source depends on the modes
of responsibility viewed and applied in a social context." G. GIusFz, NEw Mo-A~rry, supra
note 70, at 163. He notes that there are two situations in which the common good would be
superior to the good of the individual:
First, the intelligible human goods are superior to the good as it is experienced by
any one person: it is more important that the good be respected and realized than
that I get my little share of it. Second, the fulfillment of the group cooperative
action takes priority over unfair individual satisfaction.
Id. at 164. Cf. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2473 (1990)
(holding that erroneous advice given by governmental employee to benefit claimant cannot
estop Government from denying benefits not otherwise permitted by law). The Supreme Court
noted that the purpose of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution was to "assure that
public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress
as to the common good, and not according to individual favor of Government agents or the
individual pleas of litigants." Id. (emphasis added).
81. See G. Gaisz, MoRAL PluNciPLns, supra note 23, at 280 (providing that regulatory
"[c]ivil law provides a public facility for regulating private affairs according to the public
purpose of mutual justice and common peace"). In response to the skeptic, Finals notes that
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The debtor relief process can be viewed as congressional recognition
that the intrinsic value of human dignity dictates that a debtor be given an
opportunity to earn a living.a2 The freeing of human capital provides an
individual debtor with the ability to maintain a minimum standard of living
and puts him back on the road to self-determination. Thus, discharge is an
acknowledgment by Congress that the dignity of the individual person has
value. The congressional reaffirmation of that value by the granting of a
discharge replaces dejection with hope.83 The discharge also reflects an
awareness that the productive resources of every individual are significant,
and that by releasing the debtor from his past financial obligations, his
renewed vigor will benefit society as a whole as well as himself. The
forgiveness of debt also has a rehabilitative, salutary effect as an admission
on the part of a debtor of his own inability to remedy past mistakes, and
the need to move forward with a more rational life plan.8
Exemptions, which are the other major aspect of fresh start,85 represent
the humanitarian response of society to an individual debtor.86 Exemptions
the "traditions of natural law theorizing" show that a decision of "positing law" should be
guided by moral principles that are "a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim,
convention, or mere 'decision."' J. Fhwis, NATURAL LAw, supra note 23, at 290. See also
Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 WAKE FoRasT L. REv.
429, 498 (1990) [hereinafter Hittinger, Liberalism] (listing four criteria for judicial use of
natural law in constitutional interpretation).
82. See G. GiusEz, MoRAL Pintci'x~s, supra note 23, at 137-39 (discussing bodily life
as one of basic human goods or values ).
83. The importance of the discharge to maintain and preserve human dignity can itself
support its nonwaivability strictly on moral grounds. But see T. JACKSON, Looic AND LmirS,
supra note 37, at 253-80 (arguing that non-waivability of discharge arises as a response to
weaknesses in human nature that create impulses and bias).
84. See J. Fin, s, NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 103-05 (discussing coherent life plan
as one of eight basic requirements of practical reasonableness); RendIeman, The Bankruptcy
Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.L. Rnv. 723, 726 (1980) (stating that discharge
has been said to "liberate the bankrupt psychologically").
Congress in effect has given its stamp of approval to alleviate some of the supposed guilt
felt by a debtor in extinguishing of legal obligations to pay while the moral obligation remains.
The individual's recognition of this moral obligation to repay might be one of the non-
monetary reasons for postponing the filing decision. However, Congress in enacting the Code
has left this decision to the debtor, while offering him an alternative out of society's largess
of human kindness. See F. NoEL, supra note 18, at 191-200 (discussing whether the passage
of bankruptcy legislation can eradicate even the moral obligation to pay).
85. See CommsioN RnPoar, supra note 21, at 109, 169; Countryman, supra note 15, at
818 (providing that "[o]bviously, the debtor's future wages were essential to his 'fresh start'
but the exemptions he was allowed to retain from his existing estate were also a significant
element in the measurement of the extent of that fresh start.").
86. See Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt
Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERs L.
REv. 615, 621 (1978) (asserting that exemptions should further one of five social policies).
These five social policies are:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his physical survival; (2) To
protect the dignity and the cultural and religious identity of the debtor; (3) To
enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in the future;
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give a debtor the basic necessities of life and place the debtor back on track
for the reconstruction of his financial life. Exemptions reflect what an
individual's community, represented by state legislature or Congress, believes
is necessary for the individual good.17 The exemption of certain property
from execution also benefits society as a whole by preventing debtors from
becoming public charges."' Furthermore, exempt property provides the basic
needs for a debtor's dependents, mirroring an acknowledgment by Congress
of the important value of preserving of the integral family unit. s9 The family
unit should not suffer the consequences of financial mistakes in which it
did not directly participate. ° Exemptions are steeped in principles of social
justice and exemplify an awareness that the distribution-or for that matter
the redistribution-of wealth in our nation should insure that each indivi-
dual's very basic needs are met.9' The retention of some minimum level of
assets, freed from one's general creditors, is in fact the ultimate humani-
(4) To protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of impoverishment;
(5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor and his family with minimal financial
support from society to the debtor's creditors.
Id. Each of these social policies are but a recognition of the underlying humanitarian value
which is the foundation of our exemption laws. Id.
87. See J. Frnis, NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 225 (stating that "the basic values
are not mere abstractions; they are aspects of the real well-being of flesh-and-blood indivi-
duals."); Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEo. L.J.
1333, 1356 (1984) (positing that "[w]ith adequate exemptions in place, the bankruptcy statutes
permit the working poor who have become hopelessly mired in consumer debt to begin again
the climb into the middle class with some assets intact.").
88. See HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADm. Naws at 6087 (stating that "It]he historical purpose of these exemption laws has been
to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that
even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute
and a public charge.").
89. See, e.g., Allen & Co. v. Ferguson, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 1 (1873) (discussing issue of
whether promise that was clear and unequivocal was sufficient to revive discharged debt). By
way of dicta in discussing what would be "right" in a particular situation, the Court noted
that "[n]either the supreme will, so far as we can ascertain it, nor the laws of the land, require
that a debtor whose family is in need, or who is himself exhausted by a protracted struggle
with poverty and misfortune, should prefer a creditor to his family." Id. at 4. Part of the
moral obligations flowing from living in a family relationship is the duty to provide for those
members of the family unit. By entering into a family relationship one has made a commitment
and one should respond to that commitment out of fidelity, and should not abandon the
commitment lightly.
90. By permitting the family to suffer one would be ignoring a Grisez-Finnis requirement
of practical reason. The third rule of practical reasonableness equates to the "Golden Rule":
"Do to (or for) others what you would have them do to (or for) you." See J. Fnms, NATURAL
LAw, supra note 23, at 107-08. There is no reason to deprive the debtor's family of what its
community articulates as a subsistent level. See also J. RAwLs, A THEORY oF JusTicE 14-15
(1971). Rawl's contractarian theory of justice as fairness should reach the same conclusion
under his difference principle. Thus, inequalities are justified if they "result in compensating
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society." Id.
91. See Shuchman, supra note 29, at 439.
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tarian response of the community to a debtor, and this response is firmly
rooted in reason.92
Conversely, when a debtor fails to comply with certain societal norms
as reflected in the legislative choices, he faces the possibility that certain
benefits of the bankruptcy process, including discharge and the discharge-
ability of certain debts, may be denied. In the case of discharge, Congress
in large part has made choices that acknowledge an awareness of the moral
dimension.93 For example, Congress has identified certain conduct that
adversely affects efforts to discover and collect assets for distribution to
creditors, such as destruction or concealment of property and has prohibited
discharge in light of such conduct.9 In these situations, a debtor's conduct
has a significantly adverse effect on the other major policy of consumer
bankruptcy-that of distributing the consequences of debtor defaults among
his respective creditors. 95 In these circumstances, principles of social justice
impose restrictions upon the rights of an individual debtor, and he must
accept the responsibility for his own misconduct under the Grisez-Finnis
theory.9 Thus, it is reasonable that Congress, after weighing the competing
interests of the two policies, has determined that as a result of certain
conduct a debtor may lose the largess of the nation. How egregious the
conduct of the debtor must be before the fresh start policy is modified by
the debt collection and distribution policy is a matter to be weighed by the
elected officials of the nation, who in theory represent the collective moral
92. See COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 21, at 172 (noting "the policy underlying
exemptions, that is, that the debtor not be left destitute and have a basis for rehabilitation").
Some level of exempt property is justified under a "sane method of natural law theory". See
Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 81, at 498 (stating that "Convergent lines of enquiry, following
the paths of institutional and historical experience as well as that of philosophical reflection,
represent the sane method of natural law theory."). The nature and type of exempt property
have always been the subject of debate. However, the inability of a debtor to have any
exemptions would be morally repugnant. Exempt property forms a base line of economic
protection for the poor.
93. In only one instance does the decision of Congress appear to be purely arbitrary.
Bankruptcy Code § 727 (a)(8),(9) (limiting access to discharge in personal bankruptcy to once
every six years). There appears to be no real moral justification for such a rule, for it assumes
that an individual who seeks a discharge is "bad," without any identification of the values
underlying the decision. See Shuchman, supra note 29, at 474 (noting that there is no moral
or economic basis for such action).
94. See Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(2)-(7) (listing debtor conduct such as destruction,
mutilation, or concealment of property, which will cause denial of debt discharge).
95. See Warren, supra note 16, at 777 (expressing view that "no one value dominates,
so that bankruptcy policy [in the context of business bankruptcy] becomes a composite of
factors that bear.-on-a better answer to the question, 'How shall the losses be distributed?');
see also Baird, supra note 16, at 816 (discussing collection efforts of creditors within state
created property rights system that requires creditors to work within moral framework of
bankruptcy system).
96. See J. Fhnwms, NATuRAL LAW, supra note 23, at 183-84 (discussing debtor's respon-
sibilities in system of commutative justice). Finnis stressed the individuals' responsibilities of
fairness to other known or unknown individuals and to the governing authorities.
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judgments of the nation." Consequently, when one talks of fresh start
policy, one needs to be cognizant that an underlying value justifying that
policy requires active, productive, and honest debtor dealings with the courts
and creditors.
It is reasonable to suppose that Congress has identified certain ethical
values that support its selection of nondischargeable financial obligations.98
In actuality, the congressional designation is a mixed bag which generally
can be viewed as punishing the "unworthy debtor" and protecting the
"worthy creditor". However, certain nonethical values also form the foun-
dation for congressional selection of some nondischargeable debts. Thus,
the application of a moral justification in the area of dischargeability does
not always lead to obvious concrete solutions, nor simple answers to
resolving all disputes. But the approach can raise the level of consciousness
in decision-making by forcing the decision-maker to acknowledge that no'
single talisman will facilitate his job, which in turn should help develop a
deeper understanding of the process."
There are basically three separate and distinct general classifications of
debts that are subject to nondischargeability. The first classification involves
obligations to former spouses and children. 100 This type of debt is most
sacred under the Code, being nondischargeable in all consumer proceed-
ings.' 01 The moral responsibility of the debtor to provide economic support
for his family is beyond question, and the exception can be explained under
the moral theory posited here as a response to the humanitarian needs of
the family.1°2 The underlying ethical commitment to one's family was
recognized by the courts even before the Act was amended in 1903 to
specifically except such obligations from discharge. 0 3
97. See, e.g., Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 81, at 498 (asserting that "the natural
law claim ought to comport with the tradition and conscience of the people").
98. Cf. T. JACKSON, LoIc AND Lmrrs, supra note 37, at 278 (stating that "questions
of the nondischargeability of particular debts should be analyzed against what bankruptcy law
is trying to do through its fresh-start policy").
99. But see Howard, supra note 20, at 1057 (asserting that ethical considerations result
in no help to the decision maker). However, even Howard acknowledges that her functional
approach is riddled with normative propositions. She overlooks the "weakness" of her
subjective value judgments to reach her ad hoc economic justification for discharge. Id. at
1088.
100. See Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5).
101. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a), 1328(a).
102. The basis of this exception to discharge is the "universal sentiment" favoring
obligations to family. See H.R. REP. No. 1698, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. (1902) (reprinted in
EASTMAN, Tan BANKR UPTCy LAW ANNOTATED 409 (1903) (hereinafter 1902 HousE REPORT).
103. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (stating that "[t]he bankruptcy law
should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate its beneficent purposes and not make
it an instrument to deprive dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance due
them from the husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose of the law to enforce.").
In Wetmore the Supreme Court based its decision on both legal and moral obligations. Id.
See also Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 352 (1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575,
580 (1901).
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The second general classification of debts that are excepted from dis-
charge are those debts owing to governmental units and student loans made,
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit.1°4 Little if any moral justi-
fication can be leveled to support the nondischargeability of tax liabilities. 05
The result appears to be more or less the result of the superior political
power of governmental units. On the other hand, the nondischargeability
of student loans can be viewed as promoting meaningful and significant
values.' °0 Under the Grisez-Finnis ideal of commutative justice, there is a
duty imposed upon an individual to be accountable for benefits bestowed
on him by a government.1 7 Thus, the failure to repay a student loan, which
might result in increased costs for others or severely restrict the availability
of future funds, could be a sufficient ethical reason to deny discharge of
that debt. 08 In terms of distributive justice concerns that individual needs
'be met, however, significant ethical reasons exist to grant discharge of such
debts. Congressional authorization for courts to grant a discharge of student
loan obligations in the event that repayment might cause undue hardship'09
reflects the proper balance of the competing values of commutative justice
and distributive justice in that it does not show a preference of one set of
values over the other.
Unacceptable conduct by the debtor in his dealings with creditors
comprises the remaining classification of nondischargeable debts. These
104. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a)(1), (8).
105. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 20, at 1058 (asserting that "the government, just
because it is the government is a favored creditor.
106. See CoMMIssoN REPORT, supra note 21, at 177 (stating that nondischargeability of
these debts was necessary because rising number of bankruptcies by students who had such
loans posed "threat to the continuance of educational loan programs"). H.R. 8200 did not
contain an exception for educational loans, but the Senate provision as modified became the
original § 523(a)(8). As enacted in 1978, it did not cover loans guaranteed by the government.
Efforts to amend it were immediate and successful in maintaining "the credibility and stability
of the student loan program and assure that future generations of students will have a viable
loan program available to them." S. REP. No. 230, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1979), reprinted
in 1979 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADnN. NEws 938.
107. Cf. Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access, supra note 18, at 1137 n.283
(stating that "[w]hile it may not be clear that student discharges were so serious a problem as
to require denial of the discharge, at least the provision was a particularized response to a
perceived abuse.").
108. See J. FiNNIs, NATURAL LAW, supra note 23, at 184 (arguing that "[a]n individual
who abuses, exploits, or 'free-rides' on some system which is advantageous to himself and to
others, knowing that his abuse may bring about the limitation or abandonment of the scheme,
is commutatively unjust to all those who might in future have enjoyed the benefits of the
original scheme."). The congressional decision of making student loans nondischargeable relies
upon certain economic assumptions that may not be empirically accurate. Furthermore, the
increased human potential of an individual may more than offset the alleged economic losses
due to the failure to make the loan repayment. Once again, this exemplifies problems that
may be created by using economic analysis in an imperfect world. See, e.g., Howard, supra
note 20, at 1087 (asserting that no economic justification exists for nondischargeability of
student loans).
109. See Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8)(B).
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debts include obligations which are founded in fraud, false financial state-
ments, willful torts, and breach of fiduciary duty, among others.110 It is in
these areas that the underlying ethical values are most obvious."' Congres-
sional emphasis is not on the normative proposition that debts should be
paid," 2 but on the degree of fairness in one's dealings with others. This is
not to say that other congressional decisions on the mix of nondischargeable
debts could not be morally justified, but only to say that there is a moral
justification underlying this classification of nondischargeable debts.
It is in resolving issues in this last classification of nondischargeable,
debts that the mutual covenant relationship between an individual and
society implicit in the Grisez-Finnis ideal of commutative justice is most
apparent. In order to receive the "gift" of debt forgiveness from the
community, one must deal with his creditors (who make up the community)
in an unobjectionable manner. To flatly reject this approach as vague and
too subjective for decision-making only reflects the desire for simple concrete
answers. Once again, it is not the purpose of this article to develop solutions
to all possible issues by uncovering and exposing the moral justification for
fresh start policy, but only to encourage others to acknowledge that such
a justification should be considered in any decision-making."13
The exceptions to discharge are all but emasculated by Chapter 13.114
The distinction between the broader discharge under Chapter 13 in which
only family obligations and taxes remain nondischargeable" 5 rests "upon
110. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a)(2), (4), (6), (7), (9).
111. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (stating that equitable
powers of bankruptcy court can only be exercised within confines of Code itself). The Grisez-
Finnis approach is not limited to a simple maxim such as, one who by his actions has not
done equity, should not expect equity in return, but does rely upon basic concepts of equity
in the application of moral principles.
112. Shuchman, supra note 29, at 469.
113. Cf. F. NOEL, supra note 18, at 189-90 (observing that through provisions limiting
right to discharge and providing for nondischargeability of certain debts, Congress has "the
key to the efficiency of the system and through it, as a control valve, the courts are able to
bring moral censorship to bear on the conduct of all debtors, and by this method a high
standard of commercial integrity is encouraged and maintained").
114. The difference between the scope of discharge under Chapters 7 and 13 can be
explained in part by an understanding that the principles of distributive justice, society's
commitment to the debtor, outweigh the principles of commutative justice, in that the individual
has offered to recompense those he has wronged through payments under a plan. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (1990).
[T]he dischargeability of debts in Chapter 13 that are not dischargeable in Chapter
7 represents a policy judgment that [it] is preferable for debtors to attempt to pay
such debts to the best of their abilities over three years rather than for those debtors
to have those debts hanging over their heads indefinitely, perhaps for the rest of
their lives.
Id. (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, para. 1328.01[1][c] (15th ed. 1986)) (footnote omitted).
115. Under chapter 13 debts grounded on fraud, (§ 523(a)(2)), on breach of fiduciary
obligation, embezzlement or larceny, (§ 523(a)(4)), willful and malicious injury to person or
property, (§ 523(a)(6)), fines and penalties, (§ 523(a)(7)) and student loans (§ 523(a)(8)) are
discharged upon completion of the plan. Bankruptcy Code § 1328(a). However, the fact that
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strong ethical considerations. If a debtor is willing to expend all or a portion
of his disposable income" 6 to the repayment of his financial obligations
over a three year period of time,"t7 he is entitled to the broader discharge.
The debtor's recognition and acceptance of responsibility, through repay-
ment of all or a part of his debts, including otherwise nondischargeable
debts, from future income reflects repentance-the acknowledgment of an
obligation and the effort to rectify it. This normative value underlies the
moral justification for the broader discharge under Chapter 13." s Viewed
in this light, the economic effects or results of the broader discharge pale
in significance to the humanitarian treatment of the repentant debtor whose
actions in repayment are imbued in principles of practical reason under the
Grisez-Finnis approach.1" 9
Fresh start policy can be summed up as reflecting an acknowledgment
by Congress of the validity of the first precept of practical reason that
"good is to be done.' ' 2 0 This policy achieves the ideal of the first principle
of morality by placing the justification for the bankruptcy process on values
of human dignity,' 2' humanitarianism, and fairness from the perspective of
many, if not most, Chapter 13 plans are not completed emasculates this broad grant of
discharge. See T. SuLLrVAN, As WE FORGIVE, supra note 3, at 216 (detailing the empirical
evidence that shows that most Chapter 13 plans are not completed).
116. See Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b)(1)(B) (requiring that upon objection by trustee or
holder of allowed unsecured claim, court may not approve plan unless all debtor's projected
disposable income is dedicated to plan). In defining disposable income the Code excludes
income reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and his dependents.
Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b)(2).
117. See Bankruptcy Code § 1322(c) (providing that court, for cause, can approve payments
according to plan for period longer than three years). However, the Code further states that
extended period may not be longer than five years.
118. If the payments are not made under the Chapter 13 plan a hardship discharge may
be granted by the Court, but the extent of the discharge is severely limited. Bankruptcy Code
§ 1328(b), (c). The debtor receives a discharge similar to that under Chapter 7. Thus, the
obligations listed as nondischargeable under § 523(a) remain. This of course creates an anomaly
in that a Chapter 13 debtor who offers to pay his creditors more, but fails to complete his
plan, might secure a hardship discharge, whereas one who offers less and completes his plan
may receive the broader discharge. This result needs to be reconsidered by Congress in light
of the values underlying a moral justification for the process.
119. Cf. Gross, Preserving Fresh Start, supra note 20, at 151-52 (suggesting that narrow
interpretation of Consumer Credit Amendments including the changes in Chapter 13, reinforces
other legal theories including antipeonage laws and other paternalistic protections).
120. But see Hallinan, supra note 3, at 139. Hallinan, like many other current bankruptcy
scholars, is unwilling to accept the fact the morality can and does underlie this fundamental
positive law and that it has a valid usefulness in assisting lawyers and judges make decisions.
121. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 52, at 173, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADM. Naws at 6134 (statement of David H. Williams, attorney, FTC) (stating that "[t]he
consumer who seeks the relief of a bankruptcy court is an individual who is in desperate
trouble."). According to the report, a bankrupt consumer "lacks the resources to meet his
commitments and has no means at his disposal to rectify this situation.... [t]his individual
is entitled to a focused and compassionate effort .... [r]elief should be provided with fairness
to all concerned but with due regard to the dignity of the consumer as an individual who is
in need of help.") Id. (emphasis added).
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an individual and his community. Under principles of distributive justice,'2
each individual in our society is entitled to a level of human dignity. In
order to achieve that dignity the individual must be provided with a
minimum level of subsistence'2 and the opportunity to provide for himself
and his family without the burden of overwhelming debt. In return for the
benefits provided by these exemptions, the values of individual fairness and
responsibility inherent in commutative justice impose certain duties and
obligations upon the debtor. The bankruptcy process recognizes that the
economic consequences of credit should in most cases be thrown upon the
credit participants.I2 Nevertheless, in those situations where the debtor has
failed to meet the standards of fair-dealing, he faces the possibility that his
debts will be declared nondischargeable.
The discharge and dischargeability issues in bankruptcy reflect the
tension that exists between the elemental moral values inherent in commu-
tative and distributive justice. In drawing the line, whether in legislation or
in deciding hard cases, the ability to acknowledge and articulate these values
can lead to a realization of the fundamental mutual covenants implicit in
the legislation. The Code's emphasis on the values of human dignity,
humanitarianism, and fairness reflect a true balancing of the competing
interests of the debtor, the creditor, and society. Having developed an
approach toward a moral justification for the debtor relief provisions of
the Code, this article now examines the history of bankruptcy to determine
if this moral justification has in fact been a part of that heritage.
Moral Justification of Debtor Financial Relief in a Historical Context
Only since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898 has bankruptcy
had as a generally recognized independent purpose the restoring of a debtor
to some level of human dignity to proceed in the future free from the
122. See, e.g., J. Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 23, at 161 (describing distributive justice
as that "ensemble of requirements of practical reasonableness that hold becaise the human
person must seek to realize afid respect human goods not merely in himself and for his own
sake but also in common, in community").
123. See BisHops' LEMrR, supra note 24, at 23 (stating that "[b]asic justice demands the
establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the human community for all
persons."); ComsimoN REPORT, supra note 21, at 169 (noting that debtor must be permitted
to retain basic means of survival) (emphasis omitted).
124. See T. Smu-vAN, As WE FoRGrvE, supra note 3, at 341 (asserting that "[t]he
bankruptcy system rests on a free market philosophy that throws the social and economic
risks of credit on creditors and debtors, rather than on society at large."). Cf. J. Fn-is,
NATuRAL LAw, supra note 23, at 175 (stating that distributive justice embodies concept of
fairness such that decisions "often turn on whether some parties have created or at least
foreseen and accepted avoidable risks while others have neither created them nor had oppor-
tunity of foreseeing or of avoiding or insuring against them"); Shuchman, supra note 29, at
439 (noting that bankruptcy law to some minor extent can be viewed as response to public
problems in distribution and redistribution of wealth).
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burdens of the past.'1 Furthermore, our present Code is a reflection of a
public acceptance that at some point the debtor should not be forced into
subjugation' 26 so that he finds himself in the position of working solely for
the benefit of his creditors. 27 Historically, there has been difficulty in
maintaining a proper balance between the interests of debtors, creditors and
society.'I Even today efforts are being made to shift the scales back in
125. Other than a brief experiment with the 1867 Act, prior to 1898 there was a firm
linkage between the two primary functions of the bankruptcy system. Specifically, debtor
financial relief was dependent upon creditor approval. The rejection of creditor consent in
liquidation bankruptcy was an acknowledgment by Congress of the separate and distinct
underlying justification for that policy. Compare Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U.S. 507, 512 (1878)
(stating that Court has "often declared that the pro rata distribution of the property of the
bankrupt was the main purpose of the bankruptcy statute [1867 Act].") (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original) with Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S., 605, 617 (1918) (asserting that "[t]he
federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the property of the debtor,
not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose of the
act [Bankruptcy Act], intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life,
free from debts, except of a certain character, after the property which he owned at the time
of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors.") (emphasis added). See also
Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. Rnv. 401, 406-08
(discussing progressive liberalization of American bankruptcy laws to point where laws no
longer required creditor consent and minimum dividends). Cf. Levinthal, Early History, supra
note 57, at 232 (asserting that world history of bankruptcy reflects "general evolution of legal
process from the stage wer [sic] retaliation is the end in view to the stage where compensation
is the chief desideratum").
126. See T. SuLmrvAN, As WE FoRGrvE, supra note 3, at 334 (stating that "bankruptcy is
one of the safety valves that sophisticated capitalism keeps in place to release the pressures of
fear and greed that accompanies free market incentives."); Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy,
85 MicH. L. REv. 1341, 1377 n.l15 (1987) (positing that "the philosophical justification for
discharge was to preserve individuals from permanent subjugation to their creditors.").
127. But see Gross, Modern Day Peon, supra note 20, at 166-67 (noting that courts have
increasingly been using § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code). Section 707(b) authorizes a court
upon its own motion or that of the trustee to dismiss a Chapter 7 proceeding for substantial
abuse. Id. Gross posits that courts use this section to "suggest that if individual debtors want
a discharge, they must utilize Chapter 13, the reorganization chapter in which the debtor works
to obtain the income needed to repay creditors over time." Id. (footnotes omitted). Gross
suggests that the Consumer Credit Amendments need to be interpreted narrowly to avoid
forcing debtors to work to repay their debts. Id. at 205. This issue was the main bone of
contention during the hearings on the Consumer Credit Amendments. The Purdue Study
advocated increasing the costs of bankruptcy by limiting exemptions or by forcing debtors
who could pay to take Chapter 13. See Sullivan, supra note 30, at 1070 (stating that "[t]he
results of the [Purdue] Study lend support to legislative proposals to limit the access of debtors
to bankruptcy discharge."). The Study was critical of the then 1978 Code that allegedly
allowed discharge to debtors who were able to repay all or a substantial portion of their debts
out of future income. PuRnur STuDY, VOL. I, supra note 15, at 30-80. For a critical review
of the study's conclusion see Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access, supra note 18,
at 1103-38. Although this author does not see the Consumer Credit Amendments as a retreat
from the values underlying the fresh start policy, any attempt to limit a debtor's option of
Chapter 7 liquidation goes to the very heart of the moral justification of fresh start. This
author, like Gross, feels that the ramifications of such a move need to be examined seriously
before courts jettison any liferafts.
128. See C. WARREN, BAauP'TcY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 144 (asserting that "a
bankruptcy law is required in the public interest of the Nation at large and for its welfare,
apart from the effect of the law upon the particular individuals on whom it is to operate").
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favor of economic and political interests over those values inherent in a
moral justification. 2 9 However, each of the earlier bankruptcy statutes has
reflected an awareness of a moral dimension for debtor relief, albeit in
some modest way.
The initial bankruptcy act 30 applied only to traders and was designed
to alleviate the adverse economic conditions that followed excessive specu-
lation in government script and stock."' The statute provided for only
involuntary proceedings 2 and for the discharge of debts on a vote of two-
thirds, in number and in value, of the creditors.' By making creditor
consent a condition for discharge and providing for only involuntary peti-
tions, the statute reflected only modest concern for the ethical values inherent
in a moral justification of the bankruptcy process. In fact, the statute's real
effect was not to achieve debtor relief, but to assist in creditor debt
collection. The opposition to the law was immediate, and the act was
repealed shortly after enactment.3 4
The passage of numerous state laws abolishing imprisonment for debt
further strengthened the opposition to additional federal legislation, which
advocated that state insolvency laws could handle the "bankruptcy" mat-
ter. '3 However, the factionalism between debtors and creditors, merchants
and farmers, and political parties, in conjunction with the financial panic
of 1837, led to enactment of a federal statute in 1841. The 1841 Act 36 was
the first of its kind to permit voluntary petitions. 37 However, the Act's
effectiveness as a means of debtor relief was limited because discharge was
conditioned upon a majority of the creditors in number and value of claims
not filing written dissent.' Henry Clay, the great proponent of the 1841
Act, noted that the law was passed not only in response to the appalling
economic conditions of the nation, but also "by all considerations of justice,
humanity, and benevolence. . . ,,39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
129. See, e.g., H.R. 4534, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Rep. Chapman
(D-Tex) on April 18, 1990, which would amend § 523(a) of Code to make all debts nondis-
chargeable in Chapter 7 also nondischargeable in Chapter 13).
130. Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19.
131. C. WARREN, BANKRupTCY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 10-13.
132. 2 Stat. 21.
133. 2 Stat. 31. See generally C. WARREN, BANKRuPTcY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 17
(positing that "we should rescue the honest and unfortunate insolvent from the oppression of
a vindictive creditor") (quoting Representative Harrison Otis from Massachusetts).
134. 2 Stat. 248. The Southern states argued that the law was not workable in an agrarian
economy and that state insolvency laws were far superior. Since the act was only involuntary
by its terms, farmers suffered at the hands of their creditors. See F. NoE., supra note 18, at
132.
135. See C. WAREN, BANUWPTCY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 52.
136. 1841 Act, supra note 49.
137. Id. at 441-42.
138. Id. at 443. However, discharge was mandated unless a majority in number and value
of the creditors filed written dissent. Id.
139. C. WARREN, BANKRuPTcY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 80 (Warren gives no reference
for this statement attributed to Henry Clay).
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acknowledged the ethical dimension of the 1841 Act by observing that one
of the two purposes of the act was to discharge the "honest debtor".40
However, the statute's use of federal exemptions without any homestead
protection 4' rekindled fear in the agricultural states regarding the potential
loss of land by debtors.' 42 On the other hand, the statute's seemingly overall
pro-debtor bent, especially in light of the availability of voluntary petitions,
led to creditor dissatisfaction. Creditors asserted that the 1841 Act was not
a bankruptcy statute but merely an insolvency statute, and, thus, its enact-
ment was beyond the power of Congress.141 It was repealed soon thereafter
140. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 151, 166 (1851) (stating that "the two
great objects of the [1841] law .... were to grant a discharge to honest debtors who should
conform to its provisions, and to distribute their property ratably among all their creditors").
The term "honest" in conjunction with debtor, insolvent, or bankruptcy has consistently
appeared in the cases and in Congressional considerations of the bankruptcy laws. See, e.g.,
1902 HousE REPORT, supra note 102, at 409 ("This amendment [referring to the amendment
to make unliquidated debts arising from fraud nondischargeable] is in the interest of justice
and honest dealing and honest conduct."). Justice Marshall in holding a state law which
attempted to discharge pre-enactment contractual debt unconstitutionally noted "[t]o punish
honest insolvency by imprisonment for life, . .. would be an excess of inhumanity ......
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819). The use of the term "honest"
by courts and Congress is intentional and implies a moral dimension implicit in the general
purposes of bankruptcy. But see Howard, supra note 20, at 1052 (asserting that "bankruptcy
law is more accurately interpreted as a series of provisions reflecting ad hoc definitions of
what is honest or worthy in particular situations").
141. 5 Stat. 443 (exempting from provisions of 1841 Act "necessary household and kitchen
furniture, and such other articles and necessaries of such bankrupt ... having reference in
the amount to the family, condition, and circumstances ... not to exceed ... the sum of
three hundred dollars; and, also, the wearing apparel of such bankrupt, and that of his wife
and children; . . ."). The 1841 Act was generally considered more pro-debtor than its prede-
cessor. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1841) ("With us, in this country,
it may be considered as wholly settled, by a wise and humane public sentiment and policy,
that the law will pursue and will permit creditors to pursue an honest but unfortunate and
hopelessly insolvent debtor no further, after what remains of his wrecked fortune has been
equitably divided amongst those to whom he is indebted.").
142. See C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY HIsToRY, supra note 57, at 32 (stating that during
debates on earlier bankruptcy legislation prior to enactment of 1841 Act concern was voiced
over lack of homestead exemptions in proposed federal legislation).
143. See F. NOEL, supra note 18, at 103-04. The problem was one of semantics. The
historical distinction between insolvency and bankruptcy laws was unclear. The creditors,
however, argued that since the statute permitted voluntary petition, it was an insolvency law.
As such, the power to enact such a law was retained within the province of the states under
the Constitution. The Supreme Court had earlier held that state insolvency laws could not
discharge contractual obligations incurred prior to their enactment. Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 207-08 (1819). However, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the grant
of power to the Congress was not an exclusive power, meaning that absent a federal enactment
on the subject, a state law would be valid if it did not impair the right of contract. Id. at
193-96. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 369 (1827) the Supreme Court, over
a strong dissent by Chief Justice Marshall, upheld the power of a state to legislate insolvency
laws that could discharge debts incurred after their enactment, but could not discharge debts
arising from obligations owed to nonresident creditors. These decisions reaffirmed the exclusive
nature of the grant of power to Congress but did little to solve the basic definitional problem.
Surprisingly, however, the issue disappeared upon the repeal of the 1841 Act, never to surface
again. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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by the same Congress that enacted it. '
Following the repeal of the 1841 Act, an air of prosperity arrived. This
was followed by passage of state pro-debtor laws that prolonged the time
for execution sales, required specific amounts to be bid at foreclosure sales,
and increased state exemptions. 45 However, following the War between the
States, increasing pressure from creditors and debtors led to the passage of
a new act which contained both voluntary and involuntary provisions and
provided for the incorporation of state exemptions.14 6 Although the consti-
tutionality of permitting voluntary petitions was vigorously contested during
the congressional debates preceding the enactment of the 1841 Act, the
Supreme Court never ruled on the validity of the 1841 Act. 47 However, by
1867 a bankruptcy law which permitted voluntary petitions was unques-
tioned. 4 The original version of the 1867 Act provided for discharge without
creditor consent, 49 but this provision was quickly amended to require some
form of creditor assent to discharge in voluntary cases. 50 The law was
144. Act of-March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. According to Noel, 33,739 debtors availed
themselves of the law, of which more than 28,000 received discharge of nearly $445,000,000
of obligations by surrendering less than $45,000,000 worth of assets, which were distributed
among 1,049,000 creditors. See F. NoEL, supra note 18, at 143-44.
145. C. WARREN, BNKu'rcy HI sTORY, supra note 57, at 87-94.
146. 1867 Act, 14 Stat. 517, 521 (1867). The Act provided for voluntary petitions and
provided for federal exemptions to include wearing apparel and other necessities as well as
such other property as was made exempt by federal nonbankruptcy law and by the law of the
bankrupt's domicile. Id. at 521-23.
147. See 1841 Act, 5 Stat. 440; Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 266 (1843)
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction case that questioned constitutionality of 1841 Act). Justice
Catron filed a strong dissent asserting the constitutionality of the Act. Id. Furthermore, in his
capacity as a circuit justice, Justice Catron reversed a district court's order which had dismissed
a bankruptcy petition on grounds that the 1841 Act was unconstitutional. See In re Klein, 42
U.S. (I How.) 277, 281 (1843) (finding the 1841 Act constitutional). Under our present
constitutional system, states are unable to provide substantial debtor relief, because the existence
of federal legislation preempts state discharge laws. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278
U.S. 261, 268 (1929).
148. See Michaels v. Post, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 398, 427 (1874) (stating that power of
Congress in enacting 1867 Act was exclusive); C. WARREN, BANKRxUTCY IIsToRY, supra note
57, at 87. Warren discusses that the focus of constitutional issues shifted from questions of
state versus federal exclusivity, to questions of retroactive application and the constitutional
mandate for uniformity. Id. See also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81
(1982) (stating that "[n]o bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights which
existed before the law was enacted in the absence of explicit command from Congress");
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (upholding 1898 Act attacked because
state exemptions were not uniform by stating "uniformity is geographical and not personal,
and we do not think that the provision of the act of 1898 as to exemptions is incompatible
with the rule"); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1137 (7th Cir.) (holding that opt out provision
of 1978 Code did not violate constitutional mandate for uniformity), cert. denied sub nom.
Sullivan v. United States, 459 U.S. 992 (1982).
149. 1867 Act, supra note 49.
150. By time of repeal consent of one-fourth in number and one-third in amount was
required for discharge in voluntary cases where the debtor's assets did not equal thirty percent
of liabilities. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 9, 18 Stat. 178, 180. No payment requirements
or creditor assent was required in involuntary cases. Id.
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:515
immediately subject to criticism on all sides 5' and amendments began to
proliferate.5 2 The act was repealed in 1878.13
In discussing what he viewed to be the congressional intent of the 1867
Act, Chief Justice Waite observed that under certain conditions an honest
debtor was to receive a discharge from those debts which he could not
pay. 154 In another decision Chief Justice Waite further emphasized an ethical
dimension that he viewed to be the essence of the bankruptcy process in
the following language:
In no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a person
of his property without due process of law. They simply require
each individual to so conduct himself for the general good as not
unnecessarily to injure another.... Every member of a political
community must necessarily part with some of the rights which, as
an individual, not affected by his relations to others, he might have
retained. Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for
the obligation of the body politic to protect him in life, liberty,
and property. Bankruptcy laws, whatever may be the form they
assume, are of that character. 55
Justice Waite's analogy of a "social contract" in the bankruptcy context is
consistent with the recognition of a mutual covenant relationship of ethical
duties and obligations flowing between society and the financially down-
trodden. As a member of society, one individual may have to part with
certain legal rights in exchange for the betterment of the nation of which
that individual is a part. On the other hand, to receive the benefit of the
bankruptcy process, an individual has the duty and obligation to conduct
his affairs in a fair manner in relation to the other individuals who comprise
the nation. 5 6
Serious national economic reversals led to the enactment of the 1898
Act, which governed bankruptcy proceedings for eighty years. 57 The 1898
Act provided for voluntary and involuntary proceedings, discharge without
151. See J. BusH, supra note 19, at 14-15 (noting major objections were to serious delays
in administration of act and the excessive fees and expenses of administration); F. NoEL, supra
note 18, at 154; C. WARREN, BANKRrTcY HISTORY, supra note 57, at 127-28.
152. See J. BUSH, supra note 19, at 13-14 (listing amendments to 1867 Act).
153. Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 169, 20 Stat. 99.
154. See Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347, 350 (1876). Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709
(1877). In the Neal case Justice Harlan noted that in interpreting the 1867 Act the Court must
do so consistently with "the object and intention of Congress in enacting a general law by
which the honest citizen may be relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency.
155. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883).
156. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 90, at 11-17. Rawl's concept of justice as fairness has
its roots in the social contract which is arrived at through rational choice. Id.
157. Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544. The Congressional debate centered on the plight of
oppressed debtors caught in the latest economic panic. See F. NOEL, supra note 18, at 157-
58.
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creditor consent,"" and the wholesale incorporation of state exemptions into
federal law.5 9 The Bankruptcy Act was a culmination of years of debate
concerning the proper weight to assign the competing interests of debtors
and creditors in the process, and represented the merger of the functions
of creditor-oriented debt collection and debtor-oriented financial relief.'6
The Act also was an acknowledgment that the nation as a whole had a
vested interest in the bankruptcy process.' 6' Additionally, the Act reflected
an awareness by Congress that fresh start, through the protection of the
honest, unfortunate debtor, 62 was in fact a legitimate independent policy.
The Act marked the end of the presumption of fault on the part of the
debtor, and the beginning of the era of debtor freedom.'6 Finally, and
most importantly, the Act established a national policy that the purported
158. Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550 (providing that discharge was available unless bankrupt
failed to satisfy specific norms to assist in the discovery and recovery of assets). Under § 17
the discharge went to all provable debts except certain specified debts, including unpaid taxes
and liabilities for fraud among others. Id. at 550-51. The Bankruptcy Act was almost
immediately amended to narrow the scope of discharged debts. See 1902 HousE REPORT, supra
note 102, at 409.
159. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 49.
160. See Noel, supra note 18, at 199 (noting that "[t]he race of diligence among creditors
is at an end."). See generally J. BusH, supra note 19, at 15-19 (discussing congressional
disputes among creditor and debtor interests over passage).
161. See H.R. REP. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. 32 (1897). The report states:
The friends of a bankruptcy law contend that when an honest man is hopelessly
down financially, nothing is gained for the public by keeping him down, but, on
the contrary, the public good will be promoted by having his assets distributed
ratably as far as they will go among his creditors and letting him start anew. The
recent financial crisis has crippled so many good, aggressive, useful citizens all over
the country that present conditions appeal loudly for the passage of a bankruptcy
law.
Id. See also F. NoEL, supra note 18, at 192 (asserting that "[f]or the common good, however,
the State has authority to interpose and to set aside the rules of 'natural justice.' By virtue
of this power bankruptcy laws have been established, which relieve the debtor who has
complied with all the legal requirements and protect him against the courts and invocation of
authority for the exaction of additional payments").
162. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (holding that to
enforce prebankruptcy assignment of future wages would be contrary to bankruptcy policy of
relieving 'the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh') (citation omitted). In Local Loan the court acknowledged that the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act was for "public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest
but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the
time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt". Id. (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). An early commentary of the Act put it this way:
The law as it stands to-day, is emblematic of our modem civilized humanitarian
development, and of the principle that 'Justice oft must be tempered with mercy.'
Thus nations may prosper, remembering that for every loss there is a gain, that
even utilitarianism has its charitable side, and that the stern decree of the 'survival
of the fittest,' is tempered with the divine edict: 'Let the strong bear with the weak.'
Hirschberg, supra note 27, at 239.
163. See, e.g., Ayer, supra note 67, at 369.
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moral obligation to pay one's debts was not as significant a value as
society's moral responsibility to assist the financially downtrodden debtor.' 64
As America moved into and through the twentieth century, the increas-
ing rise in the use of consumer credit led to a concomitant rise in bankruptcy
filings by wage earners rather than small businessmen and merchants. 165 The
increasing numbers of this new type of bankrupt resulted in the enactment
of the Chandler Act 166 of 1938. This act supplemented the existing fresh
start policy by permitting a wage earner to voluntarily retain all of his
assets by agreeing to a plan to pay all or a part of his existing debt from
future income. Upon completion of the plan, the bankrupt would receive a
discharge of any unpaid balance of his debts. 167 Chapter XIII provided an
alternative to the debtor who desired to satisfy his own ethical obligation
to pay off all or a portion of his debts, but it did not reflect any change
in the values inherent in the process. 6 However, because Chapter XIII
offered little advantage over Chapter VII bankruptcy, the chapter's history
was characterized by infrequent use.
164. See F. NOEL, supra note 18, at 200 (positing that "[t]he history of these laws is
evidence of man's humanity to his fellow man."). See generally Shuchman, supra note 29, at
449-58 (discussing various ethical issues involved in debt repayment). Shuchman observes that
"the fact that there is a legal remedy such as bankruptcy indicates that for our legislators it
makes sense to ask whether the mere making of a promise is a good and sufficient reason for
keeping it." Id. at 458. It is also interesting to note that both commentators of the bankruptcy
clause of the Constitution through the enactment of the 1898 Act agree that the right of
Congress to affect the rights of creditors and debtors for the general good is paramount and
reflects the present purported consensus of what it means to be an honest debtor. F. NoEL,
supra note 18, at 200; C. WAREN, BANmuwsT'rcy HISTORY, supra note 57, at 158-59.
165. See D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 3, at 18-25 (noting that by 1940 almost
seventy-five percent of all voluntary filings were by wage earners).
166. The Chandler Act, passed in 1938, first created Chapter XIII. Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, §§ 601-686, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086), repealed by Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682. The Act was
designed to offer a wage earner a remedy when he sought to repay rather than avoid his
obligations. The idea behind the Act was to encourage debtors to pay their debts in full over
time by offering certain inducements, such as not being adjudged a bankrupt and temporary
suspension of state collection procedures. Id. See S. REP. No. 179, 86th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADM. NEws 1446, 1447. See also Perry v.
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 396-97, reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966). Because of
the problems which arose in Chapter XIII due to the statutory requirement of a majority vote
(in number and amount) to approve the plan, 52 Stat. 934, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1938), Congress
proposed a new Chapter 13 fashioned to overcome the rigidity of this act that denied the
debtor full relief and limited the fresh start which was felt to be essential to modem bankruptcy
law. HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 119, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADm. NEws
at 6080. For an interesting discussion of the background of Chapter 13 see In re Scher, 12
Bankr. 258, 261-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
167. Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 935-36, 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1938). The scope of discharge
upon successful completion of the plan was essentially identical to Chapter VII discharge.
168. See, e.g., Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970) (stating that "[t]he wage-earning
bankrupt who must take a vacation without pay or forgo a vacation altogether cannot be said
to have achieved the 'new opportunity in life and [the] clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,' ... which it was the purpose of the
statute to provide.") (citation omitted).
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As a result of many perceived problems in the bankruptcy process,
Congress in 1970 authorized a Commission to determine the necessity of
reforming the Bankruptcy Act. 169 Following the report of the Commission,
extensive Congressional hearings took place, resulting in the compromise
Bankruptcy Code of 1978. The Code was the first bankruptcy law passed
without the direct intervention of a financial disaster. There is a problem
with determining the underlying goals sought to be achieved by Congress
in the enactment of the Code's fresh start policy because of the lack of a
clear legislative history.17 0 On the other hand, the values underlying the
enacted fresh start policy are obvious. The stronger debtor orientation in
the discharge provisions, as compared with the former law,' 7 ' represents
continued congressional support for the humanitarian values inherent in the
bankruptcy process. 7 2
The consumer credit industry took immediate steps to criticize the broad,
expansive fresh start granted by the Code. 7 3 Although the consumer credit
lobby sought to convince Congress to impose harsh limitations on the
availability of Chapter 7 and more stringent payments plans under Chapter
13, the Consumer Credit Amendments that resulted from their efforts were
ineffective. 74 Several academicians have expressed the view that these changes
169. S.J. REs. 88, 84 Stat. 468, Pub. L. 91-354 (1970). The Joint Resolution outlines the
conditions which prompted the creation of the Commission as follows: "(1) the increase in
the number of bankruptcies by more than 1000 percent in the preceding twenty years; (2) the
widespread feeling among referees in bankruptcy that problems of administration required
substantial improvement in the Act; (3) the impact on the operation of the Act of the vast
expansion of credit; and (4) the limited experience and understanding in the Federal Government
and the nation's commercial community in assessing the operation of the Bankruptcy Act."
COMmSSION REPoRT, supra note 21, at 1. The resolution sought recommendations for changes
in the Act which would "reflect and adequately meet the demands of present technical,
financial, and commercial activities." Id. at 1-2.
170. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANtR. L.J.
275, 276 (1980). The key House and Senate reports to the Code antedate the actual passage
of the Code and amendments were made to the Code up until its date of passage. HousE
REPORT, supra note 52, at 1-549, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADm. NEws at 5963-
6435; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-176 (1977), reprinted in U.S. CODE & CONG.
ADm. NEws 5787-5962 [hereinafter SENATE RE~oRT].
171. See Cohen & Klee, Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 681, 721 (1980); Hallinan, supra note 3, at 86.
172. See Hallinan, supra note 3, at 86 (noting that Code reflects triumph of those who
felt goal of law ought to be to alleviate effects of financial failure).
173. See PURDUE STUDY VOL. II, supra note 4, at 139 (stating that "[b]y providing a
legal method to uncouple the legally binding credit contract between the lender and borrower,
the current bankruptcy law could be expected to increase the risk and therefore the cost of
all unsecured credit."); Gross, Preserving Fresh Start, supra note 20, at 76-80; Sullivan, Warren
& Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wisc. L. REv. 1087,
1093.
174. There is little legislative history to reflect congressional intention for the Consumer
Credit Amendments. There was no official report from either the House or the Senate. See
130 CONG. REc. H1809 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (Representative Hyde stated that Congress
avoided "providing a sound authentic basis for legislative history, that unique resource most
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mark a retreat in the fresh start policy. 7 However, these amendments
should be viewed as modest limitations at best in the scope of the fresh
start policy. The overall moral justification remains, and the values under-
lying that justification still form the foundation of debtor financial relief.
The release from the legal obligation to pay one's debts always must be
tempered with society's concerns of social justice for all its members. These
amendments do not mark a retreat in the historical trend that has seen
debtor relief move from a process of achieving greater payments to creditors 76
to a concern for the wellbeing of the financially downtrodden.'7 The nature
relied upon by the courts to plumb the legislative intent of this learned body .... "). Although
there was a great deal of information elicited at hearings and various statements made on the
floors of each house on the date of passage on June 29, 1984, there is not a distilled legislative
intent. There are of course various "unofficial" legislative histories. See, e.g., In re Keniston,
60 Bankr. 742, 744-45 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 388-93 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985); In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). See also Morris,
Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27
WM. & MARY L. Ray. 91 (1985). In the area of consumer bankruptcy there were three modest
changes that impacted debtors. Bankruptcy Code § 707(b) (permitting court on own motion
and that of trustee to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse); Bankruptcy Code §
1325(b) (permitting an objecting unsecured creditor to a Chapter 13 plan to force the use of
all the debtors disposable income to fund a plan); Bankruptcy Code § 1329(a) (permitting a
party in interest to request a modification of the Chapter 13 plan after confirmation). The
statute also enlarged the scope and effect of the discharge by expanding the prohibition against
governmental discrimination to include private employers as well. Bankruptcy Code § 525(b).
175. See Gross, Fresh Start, supra note 20, at 82 (stating that "Congress's capitulation
to the creditors position is no surprise."); Hallinan supra note 3, at 96 (positing that "[in
short, Congress having briefly experimented with a relatively unequivocal vision of the 'fresh
start' policy, appears to have become troubled by what it wrought and to have retreated to
the familiar comforts of statutory obscurity."). Cf. In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir.
1989) (citing with approval Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (1988), which
held that debtor's ability to pay his debts when due as determined by his ability to fund
Chapter 13 plan is primary factor courts should consider in determining cases of substantial
abuse under Section 707(b)).
Decisions like Walton clearly lend support to fears that the Consumer Credit Amendments
mark a retreat from the high water mark of fresh start policy. The problem, however, is that
commentators and courts are refusing to focus on the ethical considerations implicit in the
law. By doing so, it would become apparent that substantial abuse in a Chapter 7 case must
refer to prepetition conduct of the debtor that fails to meet standards of commutative justice.
An ethical approach to these issues can avoid the "alleged retreat."
176. Discharge began in English law as an encouragement to debtors to obey the law and
to cooperate with the bankruptcy process which had been started by the creditors. See 4 Anne,
ch. 17 (1705); J. MACLAcHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRuPTcY 88 (1956).
177. Fresh start policy and the goals sought to be achieved through it are often muddled
by the use of the words "worthy" and "honest." See Howard, supra note 20, at 1050-59
(noting confusion regarding fresh start policy). Trying to correlate reasons for or against
granting a discharge or for resolving a dischargeability issue in these terms often leads to
hapless confusion. However, to disregard the underlying values intrinsic in these terms and to
begin "afresh" with economic models or approaches of incentives or disincentives misses the
mark. Historically, in the area of debtor financial relief there has been one and only one issue
that has constantly been given significant approval by courts and Congress: the need to assist
the financially downtrodden. Even when the moral justification has directly conflicted with
economic or political matters, Congress has always given these ethical concerns the greatest
weight.
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of that response may change as a result of economic or political pressures,178
but the fundamental principle now is entrenched too firmly to be questioned.
In fact, despite heavy lobbying, Congress clearly has rejected the credit
industry's "pay till it hurts" position. 1 9 Thus, although a more demanding
payment requirement was imposed in Chapter 13 cases, the broad discharge
remained unaffected in Chapter 13,110 even though efforts were made to
severely restrict it."s '
Our present system of debtor financial relief has rejected the significant
use of economic incentives or disincentives to motivate debtor conduct. 8 2
The process represents an awareness that debtors are real people and cannot
178. See Shuchman, supra note 29, at 444-45.
179. See T. SuLawv, As WE FORGIVE, supra note 3, at 335. In perhaps the most
insightful statement in As WE FORGIVE the authors observe: "Yet bankruptcy is not itself the
cause of anything-only the result." Id. at 328.
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a); S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-22 (1983) (discussing
problems generated by small payout plans in Chapter 13 and recommending amendment to
Chapter 13 requiring all income not necessary for support of debtor and his family be dedicated
to plan). The Report accompanied S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), a bill passed by the
Senate in 1983. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, incorporated this proposal of the Senate with modification.
181. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 17 (1983) (noting that-debtors under
Chapter 13 plans were paying extremely small amounts on debts which would have been non-
dischargeable in Chapter 7, and recommending that § 1328(a)(2) be amended to prohibit
discharge of unpaid § 523(a) debts after completion of Chapter 13 plan). In enacting the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 the changes suggested in SENATE
REPORT No. 65 were rejected. The failure of Congress to make statutory changes can give
guidance in determining Congressional intent. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239,
247-48 (1972); The Effect of an Unsuccessful Attempt to Amend a Statute: A Correspondence
Between Charles H. Willard and John W. MacDonald, 44 Cornell L.Q. 336 (1959).
182. It has long been the position of certain law and economic scholars that by manip-
ulating the alleged benefits and costs of the bankruptcy law, one could predictably affect
debtor behavior. See Meckling, supra note 42, at 27 (stating that "[c]hanges in bankruptcy
law which lower the costs or raise the benefits to debtors of one of those three options
[Chapter VII, Chapter XIII, or informal settlements] will without question increase both the
number of debtors who elect that option and the total number of debtors who elect one of
the three in preference to repayment."). Cf. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53
TEx. L. REV. 757, 763 (1975) (arguing that "the legal system is treated as a given and the
question studied is how individuals or firms involved in the system react to the incentives that
it imparts"). Because arguably under neoclassical economic theory debtors are rational max-
imizers, these debtors' behavior could be predicted and controlled or strongly influenced by
economic incentives or disincentives. See Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978: An Alternative Approach, 71 GEo. L.J. 1129, 1153 (1983).
The use of microeconomic models based on simplistic or unrealistic assumptions is
uniformly used in other areas of economic analysis as an intuitive and nonmathematical way
to analyze legal issues. However, the Consumer Bankruptcy Project's conclusions have cast
serious doubt upon the ability of simplistic economic models (such as those used in the Purdue
Study) to be predictive of debtor behavior to economic incentives. Sullivan, Warren and
Westbrook, Real People, supra note 15, at 705-06. When viewed in a macroeconomic pro-
spective, however, even the conservative law and economic scholar should be willing to
acknowledge that there are certain economic and noneconomic gains to society as a whole by
any system of debtor relief.
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be controlled or manipulated through economic models or unrealistic as-
sumptions concerning their behavior."" Historically, fresh start policy has
acknowledged both the humanitarian response of a nation to the impover-
ished debtor and the realization that there is a covenant between a debtor
and society that requires a certain level of fair dealing on the part of the
debtor. The historical treatment of debtors in the United States also reflects
a rich heritage of growth in the area of social justice. Thus, the underlying
goal of the consumer bankruptcy process has evolved from retaliation, to
compensation, and now to compassion and concern for those less fortunate
in our society. Through this evolution the fundamental values of dignity,
humanitarianism, and fairness have become more firmly entrenched.'4
This brief historical journey has established that the moral dimension
is now and always has been a part of the debtor financial relief process.
Intertwined with economic and political issues, concepts of dignity and
justice have been at the very root of the bankruptcy process from its
inception. The continued vitality of the process demands that courts remain
attached firmly to this moral foundation. By approaching issues of debtor
relief in this manner, perhaps courts can begin to regenerate public values
of morality.'85 This article now turns to an application of the moral
justification in two current areas of concern for the consumer debtor.
Tim LIEN AVOIDANCE PROBLEM
Historically, discharge in and of itself has not been considered sufficient
to give the debtor a fresh start. Accordingly, our bankruptcy laws have
provided for the retention of certain assets by the debtor to give him a
minimal new beginning. 8 6 Traditionally, the bankruptcy laws have relied
primarily upon nonbankruptcy state exemption laws to place certain property
beyond the reach of creditors. 1 7 However, the present Code provides a
183. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Real People, supra note 15, at 706 (stating that
"models without supporting data should be treated like Trojan horses").
184. Although referring to the law in general, Lon Fuller's following comment equally is
applicable to the bankruptcy process: "In one aspect our whole legal system represents a
complex of rules designed to rescue man from the blind play of chance and to put him safely
on the road to purposeful and creative activity." L. FULLER, supra note 22, at 9.
185. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 15 (asserting that "[wie need public morality to have
law, true, but even more, we need law to have a public morality.").
186. The development of exemptions in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence can be traced to the
period where inability to pay one's debts was no longer considered a crime and the recognition
of the need for minimal property free from creditors' claims. See F. NOEL, supra note 18, at
28-29.
187. See supra notes 130-68 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional provision did not prevent incorporation of state law into federal bankruptcy
law despite the fact that such would lead to different results depending on the state in which
the debtor resided. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). Bankruptcy law
is uniform "when the trustee takes in each State whatever would have been available to the
creditors if the bankruptcy law had not been passed. The general operation of the law is
uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different States." Id. at
190.
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debtor with the option of declaring exemptions under the laws of the state
of his residence"'8 or under a newly created federal list of exemptions. 18 9
The Code also provides that the states have the power to eliminate this
debtor option by opting out of the federal scheme of exemptions. 19° As of
this writing thirty-five states' 91 have elected to opt out, leaving their residents
with only state exemptions.192
188. The Report of the Commission was highly critical of the reference to nonbankruptcy
law to determine exemptions under bankruptcy legislation. ComssIoN REPORT, supra note
21, at 171 (the Report suggested a federal exemption system to avoid "the unfairness of
existing state exemptions laws, most of which are archaic, some of which are unduly generous,
and some of which are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as to urban residence") (citation
omitted).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Section 522(b) provides in part:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative,
paragraph (2) of this subsection.... If the parties cannot agree on the alternative
to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (1), where such election is
permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed. Such property is
(I) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State
law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection
specifically does not so authorize; or in the alternative, (2)(A) any property that is
exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or
local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in
which the debtor's domicile has been located.
Id. Section 522(d) lists the federal exemptions which specifies eleven different categories of
property which Congress felt necessary for minimum existence.
190. Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(1). The original House bill, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), did not contain this opt-out provision. The Senate proposed the adoption of
exemption laws of the debtor's resident state noting that the liberal federal exemptions proposed
by the House would be contrary to the policy of the bankruptcy laws by giving the debtor
"instant affluence," not a fresh start. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 170, at 6, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADM. NEws at 5792. The choice between state or federal exemptions
and the opt-out provision was the result of a compromise between these two viewpoints. The
constitutionality of the opt-out provision has been upheld. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131,
1137-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982) (holding that Bankruptcy Code's opt-out
provision did not violate constitutional command that bankruptcy statute be uniform).
191. See 1 NORTON, BANxRuRPTcY LAw & PRACTICE § 26, exemption app. 1-201 (1987 &
Supp. 1989, 1990) (listing states that have opted out).
192. The compromise resulting in the present § 522(b) has been widely criticized. See,
e.g., In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416, 421 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the entire scheme of
optional state exemptions [a scheme that includes as we saw a provision authorizing the state
to opt out] that underlies the difficulties of the present case is such a mess as to call into
question the skill of the Code's draftsmen with regard to questions of exemption generally");
Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575, 650-
52 (1980); Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58
N.C.L. REv. 771, 803-04 (1980). See also Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtor's
Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1. Haines observes that Congress
failed to recognize the problem it created by "on the one hand, articulating a policy protecting
a debtor's fresh start by enabling him to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money securities
interest in exempt property while, on the other hand, declaring deference to state exemption
statutes which could preclude operation of lien avoidance powers, by eliminating exemptions
in the presence of liens." Id. at 30.
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To protect a "debtor's exemptions, his discharge and, thus, his fresh
start,"' 193 Congress enacted section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.'1 This
section authorizes debtors to avoid certain nonpurchase-money liens on
exempt property to the extent that such liens impair exemptions. This statute
was a direct congressional response to two separate but pervasive problems
that hindered the fresh start policy. The first problem was the blanket
security interest taken in household goods. 95 Congress responded by per-
193. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 52, at 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM.
NEws at 6318; SENATE REPORT, supra note 170, at 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEws at 5862. Both of the reports noted that a debtor may avoid such liens to the
extent that the "property could have been exempted in the absence of the lien." Id. (emphasis
added). Both houses of Congress were also concerned with state laws that permitted waivers
of exemption rights. Id. To preserve this avoidance power, Congress greatly restricted the
creditors' right to effectively use waivers in a bankruptcy proceeding. Section 522(e) makes
unenforceable waivers executed in favor of unsecured creditors on property the debtor chooses
to exempt and makes unenforceable waivers that attempt to restrict the debtors power to avoid
liens under § 522(f). The waiver of exemptions can have both a direct and an indirect impact
on the debtor. See, e.g., Cross, The Application of Section 522(/) of the Bankruptcy Code in
Cases Involving Multiple Liens, 6 BANKR. Dnv. J. 309, 312-13 (1989). An example of the
direct waiver would be a debtor's execution of a document that explicitly waives his right to
an exemption. However, just as devastating is the indirect waiver of an exemption by giving
a valid security interest in property that otherwise would be exempt. Congress dealt with this
indirect waiver by the enactment of § 522(0.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of
this section, if such lien is
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the
personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade
of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws
at 6087-88.
195. The House Report contained the only significant legislative history on the section.
The Report stated that creditors often take a blanket security interest as a form of leverage
to force the debtor to pay the debt by threatening total repossession should the debtor fail to
pay. The Report continued by stating that in the event of sale by the creditor the receipts
would be minuscule compared to the replacement cost to the debtor. Id. The Commission had
recommended that "nonpurchase money security interests should not be enforceable as to
items of property essential to a debtor's well being, such as wearing apparel, which are of
little or no value to a creditor, other than as a means of coercing payment." CoM ssIoN
REPORT, supra note 21, at 169. The final provision as enacted allowed avoidance of nonpos-
sessory, nonpurchase money security interests on a wider range of "necessities." See generally
Nowka, Debtor's Right to Avoid Nonpossessory, Nonpurchase-Money Security Interests: Effect
of State Lien Conservation Statutes, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 127, 149-56 (1985). The Federal Trade
Commission had identified the problem of nonpurchase-money nonpossessory blanket liens as
an abuse with no justification. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 52, at 171-72, reprinted in 1978
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mitting debtors to avoid such liens in whole or in part,19 which preserved
for debtors a minimum amount of exempt property to begin their fresh
start. The second problem was that creditors brought legal proceedings
against a debtor shortly before bankruptcy and obtained judicial liens on
the debtor's property.'1 Congress has sought to limit the power of creditors,
whatever the underlying nature of their claim, to obtain these liens. Thus,
the lien avoidance power under section 522(f) was extended to judicial liens.
Since the ability to avoid judicial liens to preserve exemptions was a judicially
recognized doctrine that predated the Code,' 98 the enactment of section
522(f)(1) was generally considered a codification of the earlier doctrine.' 99
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws at 6132-33 (statement of David H. Williams, attorney,
Federal Trade Commission) (noting that use of such devices provide effective lever for securing
refinancing and securing anticipatory reaffirmation of debt otherwise dischargeable). The
Federal Trade Commission subsequently enacted regulations that attack the practice in a
nonbankruptcy situation as to creditors holding such liens. See FTC Trade Regulation Rule
on Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-.5 (1985).
196. The avoidance power goes only to that portion of a lien that impairs an exemption.
Thus, to the extent that a lien exceeds the allowed exemption, that lien will continue to exist
in part.
197. See HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADm. NEws at 6087-88 (stating that "[ilf the creditor beats the debtor into court, the debtor
is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions."). See generally Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial
Liens That Impair Exemptions in Bankruptcy: The Workings of 11 U.S.C. § 522()(1), 63 AM.
BANK. L.J. 375 (1989).
198. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913). The
Bankruptcy Act automatically invalidated all liens obtained by judicial process against an
insolvent within four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding. However,
because exempt property was not property of the estate under the Act, it was not clear prior
to Hall whether the debtor could avail himself of this avoidance power. The Supreme Court
in Hall interpreted the Act to permit the bankrupt to invalidate liens on property set aside by
him as exempt. Id. at 514-15. The Court noted that such an interpretation would discharge
"him from his liabilities and enabl[e] him to start afresh with the property set apart to him
as exempt." Id. at 515. Following Hall there was a divergence of views concerning what the
result would be when a preexisting judicial lien attached to property which subsequently became
exempt or was acquired after the lien attached. The majority of the cases held that a bankrupt
could not benefit through the avoidance procedure. See, e.g., Hemsell v. Rabb, 29 F.2d 914,
915 (5th Cir. 1929) (holding that bankrupt not entitled to use avoidance power because under
Texas law he only acquired "the equity in the land over and above the pre-existing lien"); In
re Porter, 3 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Fla. 1933).
199. See In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864, 867 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "[w]ith respect to
avoidance of judicial liens, Congress was in 1978 doing nothing more than it had done eighty
years earlier."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984). In Ashe the court held that the statutory
power to avoid judicial liens could be retroactively applied in spite of the rule in Holt v.
Henley, 232 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1914) (stating that in absence of clear expression of congressional
intent, statute purporting to divest property interest would be applied only prospectively). The
court reasoned that Congress was well aware of the Hall decision, and understood that §
522(f)(1) was intended to preserve that rule. Ashe, 712 F.2d at 867. Thus, to apply the statute
to judicial liens created prior to its enactment did not violate a property owners constitutional
rights because the same result followed under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 868. Given this
generally recognized fact, it is not surprising that the legislative history for § 522(f)(1) is
noticeably less informative.
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Clearly, section 522(f) is an integral part of the humanitarian response
of Congress in implementing financial relief for individual debtors. Upon
receiving his discharge, a debtor has his future earning power in hand.
Also, he may continue forward with minimal goods in the form of exempt
property, which remains free from most creditors," ° except to the extent
that liens on such property cannot be avoided.2° However, the effectiveness
of section 522(f) seriously has been impeded in those states which have lien
conservation or preservation statutes.m These laws define exempt property
for purposes of state exemption laws in a way that prevents the application
of the lien avoidance statute. 3 The failure of courts to acknowledge the
200. See Bankruptcy Code § 522(c)(1) (stating that exempt property is still subject to
debts arising from taxes and family support obligations).
201. See Bankruptcy Code § 522(c)(2) (providing debtor's exempt property is still liable
after case for claims of creditors holding unavoidable liens in such property). If a secured
creditor has an interest in the property declared exempt by the debtor, the interests of that
creditor will take priority over that of the debtor unless and to the extent avoided. An
interesting anomaly is created in that although the obligation to repay on the part of a debtor
is extinguished, the lien and obligation of the property itself to an unavoided creditor continues.
See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). The legislative history of § 522 clearly indicates
that the rule of Long is accepted and that the bankruptcy discharge "does not prevent
enforcement of valid liens on nonexempt property as weli as on exempt property." See HousE
REPORT, supra note 52, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS at 6317;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 170, at 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws at
5862. Thus, if an unavoided lien survives bankruptcy, only the personal liability of the debtor
is eliminated. Cf. In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing lien avoidance under
§ 506(d)). The alienability of exempt property is not contrary to the values inherent in the
moral justification for debtor financial relief. To acquire what becomes exempt property it
often is necessary to incur debt. Thus, the very existence of exempt property can be dependent
upon the actions of certain creditors. To permit the avoidance of such liens would be to
violate principles of commutative justice. The covenant relationship between society and the
debtor which gratuitously grants the humanitarian gift of exempt property imposes upon the
debtor the reciprocal obligation and responsibility to return the purchase price. Thus, to keep
property, in all fairness one must pay for it. Although the avoidance of all nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money liens could be justified on grounds of fairness (in that those obligations
are not related to the creation of the exempt property), the present system of limited avoidance
found in § 522(f) is morally justified. It is the lack of direct reciprocal benefits and burdens
that supports the inalienability of the right of discharge under the moral approach advocated
in this article.
202. See Nowka, supra note 195, at 129. Nowka identifies lien preservation or conservation
statutes as those laws which conserve liens on exempt property "by either preventing the
application of exemptions from impairing security interests, prohibiting the application of
exemptions to property in which the debtor has voluntarily granted a security interests, or
defining the amount of exemption or the debtors interest in the exemption to be the value of
the asset exclusive of liens or to be the debtor's equity." Id. The problem generated by these
statutes is exacerbated because some courts have adopted the position that § 522(f) does not
come into play unless there is an actual right to an exemption under state law, as opposed to
determining whether there would be a right to an exemption under state law in the absence
of a lien. See, e.g., In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that under
Louisiana law, because household goods and furnishings subject to chattel mortgages are not
exempt, Louisiana debtor may not avail himself of § 522(0).
203. See, e.g., TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a) (Vernon 1984) (providing that "[elligible
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humanitarian and human dignity values inherent in exemptions2 has re-
sulted in the emasculation of the fresh start policy in these states for debtors
who select state exemptions. 2°5 Florida serves as a prime example.
In In re Owen, creditor Helen Owen obtained a final judgment against
the debtor in 1975, which she promptly filed in the real property records
personal property that is owned by a family and that has an aggregate fair market value of
not more than $30,000 is exempt from attachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction
of debts, except for encumbrances properly fixed on the property."); In re Allen, 725 F.2d
290, 293 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that under Texas law property subject to security interest is
not exempt, thus § 522(f) can be of no avail in avoiding liens on such property). But see In
re Thompson, 59 Bankr. 690, 696 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986) (stating that Allen case is "simply
wrong").
204. A part of this problem can also be traced to commentators who have also failed to
tie exemptions together with discharge in an articulation of any justification for fresh start
policy. Professor Jackson, for example, views § 522(f) as a proper subject of uniform national
legislation justified "on the ground that the pervasiveness of impulsiveness, incomplete heu-
ristics, and externalities." T. JACxSON, Looic AND Lmirrs, supra note 37, at 265. But see
HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADM. NEws at
6087 (stating that "H.R. 8200 adopts the position that there is a Federal interest in seeing
that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his
fresh start. Recognizing, however, the circumstances do vary in different parts of the country,
the bill permits the States to set exemption levels appropriate to the locale, and allows debtors
to choose between the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the bill. Thus,
the bill continues to recognize the States' interest in regulating credit within the States, but
enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
In re McManus, 681 F.2d at 358 (Dyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that "Congress recognized
that exemptions, whether state or federal in origin, are an essential feature of the system of
financial rehabilitation afforded the hapless debtor in bankruptcy proceedings. Congress
reasoned that since exemptions are so essential to this goal of rehabilitation they should be
made available to debtors regardless of whether or not state law would permit their waiver or
surrender.").
205. Although the arguments presented in the various cases differ depending on the
particular state statute involved, the basic position is similar. Because state law limits or
eliminates exemptions in property subject to security interest, or defines exempt property as
the debtor's equity only, § 522(f) is not applicable. If the property or the debtor's interest in
the property is not exempt, then the lien does not impair an exemption. Thus, there is no
need to avoid a lien. On the other hand, there is no logical interpretation of the statutory
language of § 522(f) that would lend support to an argument that the lien avoidance provision
applies only when a debtor takes the federal exemptions. Seee.g., In re Maddox, 713 F.2d
1526, 1529-30 (l1th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging universality of lien avoidance and applying it
to situation where debtor had no equity in property under state law). In fact, even in those
cases where lien avoidance has been denied because of state lien conservation statutes, the
courts have given "lip service" to § 522(f). See, e.g., In re Allen, 725 F.2d at 293 (stating
that "[i]f one elects to use the Texas exemption statute, any property exempt under the statute
is subject to the section [522](f) lien avoidance."). In states where the federal exemptions are
available, a debtor is allowed to avoid liens on property permitted under the federal laundry
list despite the existence of no equity. See, e.g., In re Dixon 885 F.2d 327, 330 (6th Cir. 1989)
(noting in dicta that federal exemptions permit avoidance even if debtor has no equity); In re
Brown, 734 F.2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that debtor who had selected federal
exemptions could avoid lien even in cases where debtor had no equity interest in property).
In Brown the court reasoned that the legislative history provided that a debtor could avoid a
lien "to the extent that the property could have been exempted in the absence of the lien."
Id. (citation omitted).
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of Sarasota County, Florida.2°6 Under Florida law this judgment lien would
have attached to all the real property of the debtor in the county except
the debtor's homestead. 2 7 As luck would have it, however, the debtor had
no homestead. Over eight years later in 1984, the debtor acquired a
condominium in Sarasota County, but because the debtor was a single
person, the debtor was not entitled under Florida law to a homestead
exemption at the time of acquisition. 208 Thus, the judgement lien attached
to the property. In 1985, the Florida Constitution was amended to permit
a single person to acquire a homestead. 2 9 In January of 1986, the debtor
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding claiming the condominium as
exempt.2 0 The bankruptcy court in an unreported decision denied the
debtor's motion to avoid the lien. 21' The case was appealed to the district
court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. 212 The district
court held that even though Florida had opted out of the federal exemption
scheme, section 522(f) could still apply.23 However, because the debtor's
interest was subject to the preexisting lien at the time of acquisition, the
court held that the lien was not avoidable. 21 4
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The court
rejected the debtor's argument that section 522(f)(1) allowed him to avoid
the lien because at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition he
qualified for the Florida homestead exemption. 215 The opinion briefly ad-
dressed the issues involved without any serious consideration of the under-
lying justifications for lien gvoidance. The court merely noted that under
Florida law preexisting judgment liens attach to subsequently acquired
homestead rights. Simply stated, under Florida law the debtor's homestead
206. In re Owen, 86 Bankr. 691, 693 (D.C.M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 44 (1lth Cir.
1989), cert. granted sub nom. Owen v. Owen, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990).
207. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4 (1968, repealed 1985). See also Bessemer v. Gersten, 381
So.2d 1344, 1348 (Fla. 1980) (holding that under Florida Constitution where property acquired
homestead status after lien came into existence, lien would be valid).
208. In re Owen, 86 Bankr. at 693. At the time of acquisition of the condominium, the
Florida Constitution did not permit a single person who was not the head of a family to
acquire a homestead. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4 (1968, repealed 1985).
209. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. This amendment was effective January 8, 1985, and
permitted any natural person to acquire a homestead).
210. In re Owen, 86 Bankr. at 693. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West 1977) (providing
method for individual to designate homestead right granted by state constitution).
211. In re Owen, 86 Bankr. at 693.
212. Id. at 695.
213. Id. at 694.
214. Id. (approving line of cases that hold that judicial lien which attached to interest in
property prior to debtor's acquisition of that interest is not avoidable pursuant to § 522(f)(1)
inasmuch as phrase "an interest of the debtor in property" refers to unencumbered interest
at time of acquisition) (citations omitted).
215. In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989). The court characterizes the debtor's
argument in the following cryptic language: "[The debtor] argues that federal law gives him
an exemption that state law would not, even though the exemptions in Florida are defined by
state law because of its 'opting out' of the federal exemption." Id. at 47.
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exemption was specifically subject to the prior judgment lien. Thus, section
522(f)(1) was not applicable because there was no impairment of any
homestead right protected under Florida law. 2 6 The court of appeals decision
is wrong. By focusing only on the language of the state exemption statute
and not on the underlying values inherent in exemption policy, the Owen
court deprives the debtor of his human dignity. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari.21 7
In cases like Owen, an acknowledgment and awareness of the moral
justification for the debtor relief provisions can assist judges and lawyers
in attaining the goals sought by Congress. 218 Exemptions are the heart of
the new beginning and represent the nation's compassionate response to
economic distress. States have wide latitude in exemption matters. 2 9 How-
ever, that latitude should not be extended to the detriment of the underlying
values inherent in the moral justification for debtor financial relief. The
Bankruptcy Code gives state exemptions life in a bankruptcy context.2
State law may identify the types of property a debtor may exempt from his
creditors, define the scope of that protection, and even define the interest
in the property that a debtor must have to qualify the property as exempt.
216. Id. at 46-47.
217. Owen v. Owen, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990). The questions presented for review are: (1)
whether the lower courts correctly applied § 522(f) based upon the Florida statue which
provides that certain judgments or judicial liens create exceptions to otherwise exempt property;
(2) whether such a state statute, which creates exceptions to state homestead provisions based
upon the time the lien attaches, is permissible when a state has opted out of federal exemptions,
when § 522(f) otherwise covers this exception. Id.
218. The problems created by state lien conservation statutes and the lack of an under-
standing, or for that matter, the lack of acknowledgment of the underlying moral justifications
of exemptions, has resulted in. judicial frustration. See e.g., In re Snow, 92 Bankr. 154
(D.C.W.D. Va. 1988), rev'd, 899 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed sub noma.
Green v. Snow, 59 U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. July 2, 1990) (No. 90-44). The district judge, feeling
constrained to apply the Virginia lien conservation statute, stated that the "result, in this case
may seem harsh and indeed is quite unfortunate for the appellee." In re Snow, 92 Bankr. at
161. The appellate court reversed holding that § 522(f) could be used to void this lien even in
spite of the state's lien conservation statute. In re Snow, 899 F.2d at 340. See also In re
Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom.
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, Ill S. Ct. 507 (1990). Judge Posner noted that the court's decision to
void a lien granted by a divorce court relating to the division of property was "a perversion
of bankruptcy law, is a product neither of judicial hardheartedness not legislative ineptitude,
but of judicial misunderstanding of the lien avoidance provision of the Bankruptcy Code."
Id.
219. See e.g., In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983). In Reed the debtor had
converted non-exempt personal property into exempt real property on the eve of filing
bankruptcy as permitted by state law. The court liermitted the exemption under state law but
denied the discharge, noting that the entitlement to discharge was to be determined by federal
law. The court concluded that "[w]hile the Code requires that, when the debtor claims a state-
created exemption, the scope of the claim is determined by state law, it sets separate standards
for determining whether the debtor shall be denied a discharge.
220. See, e.g., In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864, 868 (3rd Cir. 1983) (concluding that "[i]n each
case [federal or state exemptions], however, it was the federal bankruptcy law which made the
exemptions effective."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
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But once a debtor moves into the bankruptcy process, federal law must
dictate a debtor's entitlement to lien avoidance. This approach in fact may
result in the creation of an "additional" or "expanded" exemption that
would not be available to a debtor under his own state law outside of the
bankruptcy context. Thus, if a debtor's property would be exempt under
state law, but for the presence or existence of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-
money security interest on household goods, or a judicial lien, the debtor
should be able to effectuate congressional intent and avoid the lien. 221 To
hold otherwise permits states to limit the availability of exemptions and to
interfere with the humanitarian values inherent in the law, making section
522(f) a nullity.m Applying this approach to the Owen case makes it clear
that the lien can and should be avoided.n
221. See In re Leonard, 866 F.2d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1989) (reading legislative history to
support conclusion that issue in lien avoidance cases is whether property could have been
exempted in absence of lien). In the Leonard case the creditors had argued that Colorado by
opting out of the federal exemptions had opted out of § 522(f). Id. at 336. The court rejected
that argument and held that a state may elect to control what property is exempt under state
law, but federal law determines the availability of the lien avoidance provision. Id. at 337.
See also In re Snow, 899 F.2d at 340.
222. See In re Thompson, 884 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that in spite of
Minnesota's exemption laws, which permit debtor to waive his exemption in specific property
by encumbering such property, lien avoidance power under § 522(f) is available to void such
liens); In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582, 586 (1lth Cir. 1985) (noting that while state may be able to
determine that lien-encumbered property cannot be exempted, even though it is type of property
defined as exempt, this state classification could not prevent debtor from using § 522(0 to
avoid liens).
223. Cases involving domestic property settlement agreements create more difficult prob-
lems because of the conflict in policies. See In re Worth, 100 Bankr. 834, 837 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1989). For a detailed discussion of the problems see In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 598
(holding that nondebtor spouse's judicial lien in former marital home for purpose of securing
decree obligations was avoidable as impairing debtor's homestead exemption). In Sanderfoot
the nondebtor spouse's argument that her equitable lien was not a judicial lien under the Code
was rejected. Id. at 603-05. But see In re Borman, 886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding
that nondebtor spouse retained "equitable lien" and that such lien was not avoidable). In
Borman the court distinguished its earlier decision in Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 939 (10th
Cir. 1988) (where court had held that implied judicial lien upon homestead was avoidable
since divorce court had awarded homestead to debtor free and clear), stating that Maus was
limited to those situations where a money judgment is awarded to a nondebtor spouse without
specifically awarding her a lien on the property. 886 F.2d at 274. Thus, the Borman court
concluded as long as the divorce judgment does not award the debtor spouse the homestead
"free and clear" an equitable lien of the nondebtor spouse exists which can not be avoided
under § 522(f). Id. Cf. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner,
refusing to be drawn into the "equitable lien" argument, stated that the interest of the husband
received in the divorce was a limited interest from the beginning because a judicial lien qualified
it from the start. Id. at 607. Thus, there was no lien impairment of the husband's interest
that required avoidance. Id. Such an approach, is similar to the approach taken by the Owen
appellate court and seriously limits the effectiveness of the lien avoidance. The equitable lien
approach is, in this author's opinion, consistent with the humanitarian objectives reflected in
the fresh start policy. If Congress had intended to permit the avoidance of divorce property
settlement equitable liens "we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony,
and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed
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No doubt, absent the judgment lien, the Owen debtor could have claimed
the homestead exemption free of encumbrances under Florida law. Also,
had the homestead status been obtained prior to the judgment lien, under
Florida law the lien would have been ineffective. But in the Owen case, the
judgment lien was enforceable under Florida law solely because it came into
existence before the homestead right. However, contrary to the appellate
court decision in Owen, nothing in the languagem of section 522(f)(1) states
that the acquisition of property exempt under state law must precede the
fixing of the lien in order to be avoided in bankruptcy.25 To "avoid the
fixing of a lien" 22 a debtor must have an "interest in property" as that
term is understood under section 541.227 Furthermore, that interest in prop-
erty must be of the type to qualify as exempt property under state or federal
law. Finally, to be avoided the lien must be a judicial or nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money lien and must prevent the debtor from fully realizing
the exemptions which he has declared. No conceivable reading of the word
"lien" or the phrase "an interest of the debtor in property" can lead to
the conclusion that the timing of the acquisition of the property or the
important, and so likely to arouse public outrage." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Davis, Equitable Liens and Constructive Trusts in
Bankruptcy: Judicial Values and the Limits of Bankruptcy Distribution Policy, 41 FLA. L.
Rnv. 1 (1989) (discussing problem of equitable claims from perspective of debt collection
aspect of bankruptcy policy).
224. The task of resolving a dispute over the statutory language of the Code begins "with
the language of the statute itself." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
240-41 (1989) (holding from its understanding of plain language of § 506(b) that postpetition
interest be paid on all oversecured claims). However, if a literal interpretation of a statute
would be at odds with the legislative intent, the courts could in such a rare case disregard the
language and implement congressional intent. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571 (1982). Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
(stating that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code").
225. The majority of Courts have construed the language "the fixing of'a lien on an
interest of the debtor in property" as implying that the debtor must have acquired the property
interest "before" the creditor attached the lien to it. See In re Keenan, 106 Bankr. 239, 244
(Bankr. Colo. 1989); In re Sprick, 78 Bankr. 292, 295 (Bankr. Kan. 1987); see also In re
Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting) (asserting that it is "settled in the
nonfamily context that a debtor cannot avoid a lien on an interest acquired after the lien
attached.") (citations omitted). But see In re Chandler, 77 Bankr. 513, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (basing decision allowing avoidance on "fresh start" policy), aff'd, 1988 WL 34921
(E.D. Pa.).
226. This language is unfortunate, as it implies that the lien which is subject to being
avoided has not yet been fixed, and, thus, a debtor could not avoid a lien that was firmly in
place at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Such a literal interpretation would make the section
meaningless in light of § 362 (automatic stay) and § 549 (trustee can avoid liens place on
property of the estate after the filing). However, the statute has never been interpreted so
narrowly, and consistently has been applied to existing liens. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 867
F.2d at 422 (stating that "the creditor is simply told that if he extends security to a borrower
who later goes bankrupt, he may not be able to enforce his security to the hilt"); In re Brown,
734 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1984).
227. Bankruptcy Code § 541.
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attachment of the lien should play any role in the availability of the avoiding
power. Nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens, or judicial liens, are liens
whether they predate or postdate the acquisition of the interest of the
debtor. Such liens satisfy the requirements of the statute and can be avoided
whenever created. 22s Such a reading of the statute upholds the humanitarian
values underlying the grant of exemptions in the Code. 229
228. See United States v Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. at 235, 240-41 (stating that
statutory interpretation begins with statute's plain language). Cf. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S.
86, 91 (1987) (refusing to interpret word "agreement" found in Federal Deposit Insurance Act
which provided that agreements were not valid to diminish interest of FDIC in acquired assets
of failed banks unless agreement met certain conditions, narrowly to include only promises to
perform in future).
229. In any event, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2,
could be used to void any state law or constitutional provision which restricts or interferes
with a debtor's ability to obtain a fresh start. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971)
(invalidating Arizona's statute which provided for suspension of driver's license of judgment
debtor for nonpayment of judgment for damages resulting from automobile accident even
when debt was discharged in bankruptcy because of Supremacy Clause of Constitution); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (noting that in considering validity of state law, Supreme
Court's function is to determine if statute stands in way of accomplishing full purposes or
objectives of Congress); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927) (stating that "[w]henever
the constitutional powers of the federal government and those of the state come into conflict,
the latter must yield."). This approach has been suggested by other commentators. See Nowka,
supra note 195, at 164-66 (noting that often Supremacy Clause issue is not properly presented
for review and that courts, by focusing on state's duthority to define exemptions, attempt to
avoid issue); Parkinson, The Lien Avoidance Section of the Bankruptcy Code: Can It Be
Avoided by State Exemption Statutes? 11 OmIo NORTmRN UNIV. L. REv. 319, 330 (1984).
Thus, a state exemption law that defines exempt property in a way that prevents the
application of federal lien avoidance frustrates the full effectiveness of the debtor relief
provisions of the Code and is constitutionally invalid. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
646-48 (holding that state would frustrate congressional policy of fresh start for debtor if
permitted to refuse to renew driver's license because tort judgment resulting from automobile
accident had been unpaid due to discharge in bankruptcy). This analysis assumes, however,
that the particular state law has been authoritatively construed, such that it does in fact
prohibit the effective utilization of lien avoidance. Id. at 644. In Owen, for example, the
judgment debt was extinguished as a result of the debtor receiving a discharge. By defining
exempt property in a way that prevents the debtor from avoiding the judgment lien on what
would otherwise be an exempt homestead, the Florida Constitution and state law jeopardized
the "new start 'unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt' by
giving the creditor leverage to collect a discharged judgment debt on otherwise exempt property.
Id. at 649 (citation omitted in original). State laws which permit creditors to circumvent
effectively the fresh start policy of § 522(0 undermine the federal policy of fresh start and,
thus, fall under this stricter constitutional standard. See id. Cf. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S.
605, 615 (1918) (stating that "[i]t is only state laws which conflict with the bankruptcy laws
of Congress that are suspended; those which are in aid of the Bankruptcy Act can stand.").
Given the reluctance of the Supreme Court to reach constitutional issues, the Court can arrive
at the same result by interpreting § 522(0 in light of the humanitarian values inherent in the
debtor financial relief provisions of the Code. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis lists seven rules under which the Supreme
Court has avoided passing upon a large part of the constitutional questions raised. Rule 4 has
practical import for the issue addressed by lien conservation statutes.
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
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THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN DISCHARGE CASES
While society should act in a humanitarian manner toward the debtor,
the debtor is obligated to deal fairly with his creditors. When the debtor
allegedly defrauds creditors, the issue arises as to the proper standard of
proof that the courts should apply. The function of the burden of proof is
to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of certainty of factual
conclusions that society thinks it should have for a particular type of legal
situation.?0 The standard serves to distribute risks of mistake in factfinding
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance of the ultimate
decision.? 1 The conventional rule in civil litigation is that the party with
the burden of proof needs only to prove his case by a preponderance of
the evidence.? 2 The effect of such a level of proof is that the parties share
the risk of juror error in roughly equal fashion. However, the Supreme
Court has required that a higher standard of proof-the clear and convincing
standard-be used in certain types of constitutional litigation involving
individual rights.?3 At the close of the last century the Supreme Court also
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter.
Id. at 347 (citations omitted).
230. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Harlan's
view, the choice of the standard in any particular adjudication reflects "a very fundamental
assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations." Id. at 370.
Harlan notes that two separate and distinct propositions support his assertion. First, a factfinder
may be unable to determine "unassailably accurate" information to determine a disputed fact.
Id. Thus, the factfinder can only form a belief of what probably happened. Id. Secondly, a
factfinder may be wrong about his factual conclusions. Id. "Because the standard of proof
affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the
standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an
assessment of the comparative social disutility of each." Id. at 371. Thus, under Harlan's
analysis, a lesser standard is appropriate in civil litigation because errors in civil litigation are
not deemed "serious" from society's viewpoint. Id. at 371-72. In criminal cases, the stricter
standard is imposed "on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse
to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372.
231. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
232. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
233. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment requires more than fair preponderance of evidence in terminating parent-child
relationships); Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires more
than preponderance of evidence in involuntary civil commitment procedures); Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires
clear and convincing standard in denaturalization proceedings). But see Vance v. Terrazas, 444
U.S. 252, 266-67 (1980) (holding that Due Process Clause does not require proof beyond
preponderance of evidence in expatriation hearing); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48-
49 (1914) (holding that preponderance of evidence suffices in civil suits involving proof of acts
that expose party to criminal misdemeanor prosecution). The Supreme Court has also held
that the clear and convincing standard is constitutionally required in cases of defamation.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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had required a higher standard of proof in certain equity proceedings to
set aside written instruments by reason of fraud .2 4 Any standard other than
a preponderance of the evidence creates a bias in favor of one side of the
litigation. Thus, the resolution of the issue in the bankruptcy context depends
on whether the moral justification for debtor financial relief substantiates
a bias in favor of the debtor. The values inherent in the justification answer
a resounding no.
Under the Bankruptcy Code and the rules prescribed 5 by the Supreme
Court, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition creditors must act to prevent
the discharge of a debt. 6 If a debt is not discharged, the "fresh start" of
a debtor will be hindered because the debtor would not receive the full
humanitarian benefits of the bankruptcy process. On the other hand, the
ethical obligations imposed upon a debtor as a member of society create a
covenant relationship that imposes a fair dealing requirement on the part
of the debtor that can justify the nondischargeability of certain debts.
However, a failure to analyze issues involving dischargeability in these terms
has led to much ad hoc decision making. Nowhere has this random decision-
making been more pronounced in recent years than in the area of the level
234. See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1897). The
continued validity of these early common law fraud decisions is highly questionable. More
recently, the Supreme Court, discussing the level of proof needed in statutory fraud cases
under the Securities Exchange Act, noted that "the historical considerations underlying the
imposition of a higher standard of proof [in civil fraud actions at common law] have
questionable pertinence [in cases under the Exchange Act]." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 388 (1983). The Huddleston Court went on to hold that defrauded purchasers
of stock seeking to recover under the Act need to prove their case only by a preponderance
of evidence. Id. at 390-91. See also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355
(1943) (stating that fraud can be established under the Securities Act of 1933 by preponderance
of evidence). The Court also has noted that in civil cases "[e]xceptions to this standard
[preponderance of the evidence] are uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only
when the government seeks to take unusual coercive action . . ." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 253.
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982).
236. Section 523 limits the scope of discharge for an individual debtor for certain specific
types of debts. However, § 523(c) states:
Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall be
discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2) [false financial state-
ments], (4) [fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity], or (6) [willful and malicious
injury] of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom
such a debt is owned, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such
debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2),(4), or (6), as the case may
be, of subsection (a) of this section.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 4007, a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a specific debt
in a Chapter 7 proceeding may be brought at any time, except objections under § 523(a)(2),
(4), and (6), which must be brought within 60 days following the first date set for the meeting
of creditors. Bankruptcy Rule 4007(d) provides that the court shall set a time for the filing of
complaints to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to § 523(c) upon the filing of
a motion for a hardship discharge under Chapter 13. See Bankruptcy Code § 1328(b) (providing
that court may, under certain specified conditions, grant individual debtor a discharge similar
to that in Chapter 7, if debtor has not completed payments under Chapter 13 plan).
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or standard of proofP7 in dischargeability matters under section 523(c). 23s
In choosing between whether a creditor must establish his objection by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, a few
courts have "punted," 239 while others have selected one or the other standard
without offering a rationale for their decision.? On the other hand, some
courts have attempted to articulate justifications for different standards of
proof depending on the type of debt being discharged.?' Still other courts
237. Bankruptcy Rule 4005 provides: "At the trial on a complaint objecting to a discharge,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the objection." No rule states who has the burden of
proof in the complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt. Case law establishes that
the party objecting to the discharge of the debt has the burden of persuasion on the objection.
See Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 595 (1923). See infra text accompanying notes 264-66.
238. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 1988) (accepting
tacitly clear and convincing standard), abrogated by Grogan v. Garner, IIl S. Ct. 654 (1991);
Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (adopting preponderance of evidence standard).
Objections to the discharge of a debt giving rise to a standard of proof problem can arise in
two different factual scenarios. The first involves situations where the underlying debt was not
the subject of an earlier court proceeding, or the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable.
In these cases the court need only determine the correct standard of proof. On the other hand,
the alleged nondischargeable debt may be the result of an earlier judgment where the creditor
in the dischargeability proceeding is asserting the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In the latter
type of situations the standard of proof issue revolves around concerns that the standard used
in the earlier proceeding is different from that which should be used in the dischargeability
proceeding. Disparate standards of proof would foreclose the application of the doctrine of
issue preclusion. In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 624 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Braen
v. Lagenella, 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991). Thus, for example, if the nonbankruptcy court used a
lesser standard of proof than would be required by § 523, collateral estoppel would not apply
in the bankruptcy proceeding.
239. Courts "punt" when they avoid the standard of proof issue by claiming merely that
the plaintiff has not met even the lower standard. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848, 851 n.7
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). The field is further obscured by the fact that other courts have
avoided the issue by reverse decision making.
When courts have decided in favor of the defendant/debtor they simply state that
the plaintiff has failed to prove its case by even a preponderance of the evidence.
When they have decided in favor of the plaintiff/creditor they say that the case was
proved by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Stowell, 102 Bankr. 589, 596 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), vacated in part by 113 Bankr.
322 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
240. See In re Hunter, 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that in case where
creditor objected to discharge of debt on grounds of false representations, burden is on debtor
to prove debtor's culpability by clear and convincing evidence), abrogated by Grogan v.
Garner, Ill S. Ct. 654 (1991). This approach is no different than one of the commentators
who states without explanation that the appropriate burden of proof is the clear and convincing
standard. See 3 Co=Rnms oN BxaNgurcy, 523.08 (15th ed. 1989).
241. See In re Braen, 900 F.2d at 625-26 (stating that "the burden of proof under § 523
is the prevailing standard used by courts to resolve the types of claims underlying the particular
exception at issue"), cert. denied sub nom. Braen v. Lagenella, 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991). In
Braen the court held that under § 523(a)(6) the creditor only need a malicious and willful
injury inflicted by the debtor by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 626. However, in
dicta the court noted that in disputes relating the dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)-the
exception for indebtedness arising out of fraud-that the clear and convincing standard was
appropriate. Id. at 625.
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have given lip service to general concepts of "honesty" 2 and "fresh start"2 "
with little if any critical analysis of the underlying justification in finding
in favor of the debtor. 2"
The Garner case exemplifies the confusion in the courts. In Grogan v.
Garner a federal jury found that Frank Garner had committed common-
law fraud, breached his fiduciary capacity, and violated section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act.24 Shortly before the judgment was affirmed,
Garner sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Code listing the judgment as
a dischargeable debt. An adversary proceeding2" was brought to determine
the dischargeability of the debt, alleging that the judgment debt was non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(2). 2 7 The debtor alleged that because the
creditors were permitted to establish fraud at the trial level by a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, the debtor was entitled to a new trial on
the issue of fraud at the dischargeability proceeding. The debtor's argu-
ment was based upon his assertion that fraud must be established by
clear and convincing evidence to escape discharge.248 The bankruptcy
court rejected this argument and held that the trial judgment collaterally
242. See In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Grogan v. Garner,
Ill S. Ct. 654 (1991); In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Grogan
v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
243. See In re Foreman, 906 E.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Van Home, 823 F.2d
1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987).
244. See In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 1989) (construing Code's discharge
provisions broadly in favor of debtor to avoid facing more difficult problem of discerning
underlying congressional justification for exceptions to discharge), rev'd sub nom. Grogan v.
Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
245. Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1986). The appellate court in Grogan held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to one award of damages under either § 10(b) or common law
fraud, whichever was greater. Id. at 839. Because punitive damages were permitted under the
common law recovery, but not under the federal securities claim, the plaintiffs elected to
pursue only the fraud claim. In re Garner, 73 Bankr. 26, 27 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd
sub nom. Henson v. Garner, No. 87-0434-CV-W-1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 29, 1988), rev'd sub nom.
In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Grogan v. Garner, Ill S. Ct. 654
(1991).
246. See Bankruptcy Rule 7001 (identifying proceeding to determine dischargeability of
debt as adversary proceeding). Adversary proceedings are full blown federal lawsuits within
the larger bankruptcy case. Contested matters are disputes other than adversary disputes and
are subject to the less elaborate procedures of Bankruptcy Rule 9014.
247. Under § 1141(d)(2) the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debts excepted from discharge under § 523. Bankruptcy Code §
1141(d)(2).
248. There are two generally recognized standards or levels of proof in civil cases. In the
typical civil case for money damages a plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of
the evidence, meaning the great weight and degree of the credible evidence. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (stating that "[s]ince society has a minimal concern with the
outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence."). The effect of such a standard is that the parties share the risk of juror error in
roughly equal fashion. Id. A higher standard of proof, which courts term "clear and
convincing," is used in some civil litigation where the "interests at stake are deemed more
substantial than mere loss of money." Id. at 424.
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estopped 249 the relitigation of the issue of fraud.2 0 Thus, the debt that
had been satisfactorily established at the trial level25' was nondischarge-
able. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
249. See Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979) (rejecting application of doctrine
of res judicata to questions of dischargeability addressed in state court judgment because
exclusive jurisdiction for such issues lies in bankruptcy court). The Brown Court, however, in
a footnote and by way of dicta noted that "[i]f, in the course of adjudicating a state-law
question, a state court should determine factual issues using standards identical to those of
§ 17 [of the Bankruptcy Act which is the predecessor to § 523 of the present Code], then
collateral estoppel, in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of
those issues in the bankruptcy court." Id. at 139 n.10. See also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S.
726, 736 (1946) (holding that bankruptcy court should give effect to prior state court judgment
based on fraud and not allow relitigation of issue in objection to claim procedure under
Bankruptcy Act).
Following Browd several circuit courts have held that the doctrine of issue preclusion
applies to dischargeability litigation in bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Laudani, 783
F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Shuer, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Harold V. Simpson & Co. v. Shuler, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d
224, 228 (6th Cir. 1981). Under the approach of these courts, if the circumstances meet all
the requirements for the application of the doctrine, collateral estoppel should prevent the
relitigation of factual issues, while leaving to a bankruptcy court the determination of the
legal issue of dischargeability. In Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit statute (28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1982)) requires that "state law determine at least the issue of preclusive effect of a prior
state court judgment in subsequent action involving a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts," except in those circumstances where federal policy dictates an exception
to the full faith and credit statute. Id. at 381. In such a case the federal rule of issue preclusion
would prevail.
In the area of dischargeability proceedings, no consensus exists as to whether federal
policy dictates an exception. Compare In re Hall, 95 Bankr. 553, 555 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1989) (applying a federal rule of collateral estoppel) with In re Byard, 47 Bankr. 700, 706
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (applying a state rule of collateral estoppel). For purposes of this
article it is not necessary to determine whether the requirements of collateral estoppel are
governed by a federal or a state rule, but only that the doctrine is applicable. Thus, the focus
turns to the proper level of proof required to initiate the application of the doctrine under
either a federal or state standard.
250. In re Garner, 73 Bankr. 26, 28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). In Garner Judge Koger
relied heavily upon an opinion by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Steward of the same judicial district
that discussed the applicability of evidentiary standards to § 523 litigation. Id. at 29 (citing In
re Curl, 49 Bankr. 302, [304-06 n.6] (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984)). Judge Koger, however,
erroneously concluded by stating "that there is no real distinction between 'preponderance of
the evidence' and 'clear and convincing' as regards to 523 litigation." Garner, 73 Bankr. at
29. In Curl Judge Steward had not reached this conclusion, but had opined that although
cases and commentary suggested that the clear and convincing standard was required in cases
involving the discharge under 523(a)(2) (cases involving fraud), that the authorities cited by
these cases and commentators failed to support the proposition. Curl, 49 Bankr. at 305-06,
n.6..However, to avoid possible error in this regard, Judge Steward applied the clear and
convincing standard. Id. In Garner Judge Koger did not reach the dischargeability of the other
counts in the original complaint because two of the counts presented dischargeable debts.
Garner, 73 Bankr. at 29. The other (breach of fiduciary obligation) was not considered,
because the creditors elected to recover under the fraud count. Id.
251. The creditor presented as evidence, inter alia, the jury verdict and the trial court
judgment, then rested. Garner, 73 Bankr. at 27.
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affirmed in an unreported decision .22 Feeling constrained by earlier circuit
court opinions, 21- the court of appeals reversed, holding that the judgment
debtor was not estopped from contesting the dischargeability of the debt
because of the disparate standards of proof.2.4 In doing so the court casually
observed that because the higher standard of proof protects the fresh start
policy, courts should construe broadly provisions of the Code favoring the
debtor.' 1
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding
that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied to all of the
discharge exceptions provided in section 523(a). 256 In Garner Mr. Justice
Stevens writing for a unanimous Court asserted that the preponderance of
the evidence standard reflected a "fair balance" between the conflicting
interests of debtors' desire for fresh start and creditors' demand for repay-
ment in full of debts excluded by Congress from discharge.217 However,
instead of then articulating the underlying values inherent in its decision,
the Court enunciated several other plausible reasons for what then became
an ad hoc decision. 218 As his predecessors on the Court, Justice Stevens
fails to clearly articulate the underlying values involved in the case. His
252. Henson v. Garner, No. 87-0434-CV-W-I (W.D. Mo. Feb. 29, 1988).
253. See Matter of Van Home, 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987) abrogated by Grogan
v. Garner, III S. Ct. 654 (1991).
254. In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1989).
255. Id. at 582. The Garner court stated that applying a preponderance of the evidence
standard to the question of the dischargeability of a debt sounding in fraud would effectively
read the fresh start policy out of the Code. Id. The court stated: "We do not believe that
principles of statutory construction dictate such a reading where Congress has not expressly
announced a contrary result." Id. The Garner court specifically rejected an earlier Fourth
Circuit opinion that had held that exceptions to discharge contained in § 523(a)(6)-willful
and malicious acts-are governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. But see
Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that exceptions to discharge
in § 523(a)(6) are subject to preponderance of evidence standard). In Combs the court in dicta
noted that no heightened burden of proof was necessary for any of the dischargeability
exceptions. Id.
256. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 661 (1991).
257. Id. at 659.
258. Id. at 659-61. Justice Stevens correctly notes that since Congress did not distinguish
between the burden of proof in the various exceptions to discharge under § 523(a) that the
same standard must logically apply to each exception to discharge. He determined that since
the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in several of the nondischargeable debts
that "it is fair to infer that Congress intended the ordinary preponderance standard to govern
the applicability of all the discharge exceptions." Id. at 660. Justice Stevens then observed
that Congress has chosen by statute the preponderance of the evidence standard in other
substantive fraud causes of action. He then stated that the preponderance of the evidence
standard was used by many courts in the fraud discharge exception of the Bankruptcy Act
following the amendments to the Act in 1970 which made questions of nondischargeability a
federal question. Finally he noted that such a standard would permit an exception of discharge
for all fraud claims reduced to judgment regardless of the standard used in the state where
the judgment was rendered. He concluded by holding that for all of these reasons (including
the fair balance of conflicting interests) the preponderance of the evidence standard is the
proper standard of proof in dischargeability proceedings.
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brief discussion of conflicting interests could have been a launching pad for
a discussion of the duality of the moral justification. But suffice it to say,
the present Court prefers to hide behind a mantle of logic and semantics
and refuses to seriously address the ultimate values inherent in its decisions.
As a result the Court gives little, if any, substantive guidance to lower
courts.
The Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules prescribe no standard.
As Congress has not authorized an appropriate standard and the Consti-
tution does not dictate one,2 9 the court must prescribe one. ° The legislative
history of the Code is silent. To postulate that Congress, without expressly
stipulating, expected bankruptcy courts to apply different standards of proof
to each of the various types of dischargeable debts, or for that matter to
apply a different standard for any one class of dischargeable debts, defies
logic. To attribute to Congress, in the absence of explicit instruction, a
requirement for the relitigation of a judgment debt of the type listed as
nondischargeable is also unreasonable. Finally, to envision that Congress
wanted the courts to use one unidentified standard of proof in discharge-
ability matters (or in some dischargeability matters) and another unidentified
standard in other adversary or contested matters defies imagination. 26 1 This
is especially true given the fact that the lower standard is uniformly used
in civil litigation. It is only reasonable then to suspect that one standard or
level of proof is to apply across the board.
259. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (declaring that "[t]here is no
constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy."). In Kras the Court
held that the payment of a filing fee as a prerequisite to receiving a discharge under the
Bankruptcy Act did not violate any protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
450.
260. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981) (holding that where legislation does
not prescribe and Constitution does not dictate burden of proof standard, Supreme Court
must prescribe standard). In Steadman the Court sustained the use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard in SEC administrative proceedings aimed at permanenty barring an individual
from practicing his profession for violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act. Id. at 102.
261. The preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is used uniformly in other
areas of bankruptcy litigation. See, e.g., Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616
F.2d 573, 576 (Ist Cir. 1980) (holding preponderance of evidence sufficient in proceeding to
recover voidable preference under Bankruptcy Act); Green v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
582 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1978) (requiring that, in preference action under Bankruptcy Act,
trustee establish by preponderance of evidence that creditor had reasonable cause to believe
debtor was insolvent at time of transfer); In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 276 (Ist Cir. 1974)
(holding that fair preponderance of evidence is sufficient standard in proceeding to revoke
discharge for false oath under Bankruptcy Act); In re Ayala, 107 Bankr. 271, 274 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1989) (requiring holding preponderance of evidence sufficient to prevent discharge
in § 727 case involving transfers to defraud creditors); In re Magnus, 84 Bankr. 976, 978
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (party objecting to debtor's claimed exemptions to prove grounds for
objection by preponderance of evidence); In re Riso, 74 Bankr. 750, 757 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1987) (holding preponderance of evidence sufficient to prevent discharge for defrauding
creditors under § 727 and opining that same standard should apply in all cases involving
objections to discharge).
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The philosophical framework presented here offers useful insight for
replacing this arbitrary decision-making process and leads to a systematic
and coherent solution to the issue. The solution process involves integrating
the moral justification of debtor financial relief into a burden of proof
framework.
The covenant relationship which is at the heart of the moral justification
for debtor financial relief has two equally significant value components.
The first is the humanitarian response of society to forgive existing financial
obligations in order to preserve the dignity of a debtor, to insulate his
family from his misfortunes, and to provide an impetus to industry by
freeing human capital. On the other hand, each debtor has an implied
covenant with society that his dealings giving rise to his financial obligations
are based on fair dealing.262 These two separate and distinct underlying sets
of values need to be understood and acknowledged to reach effectively the
goals that Congress sought to achieve through the implementation of debtor
financial relief.263
By prescribing a higher standard of proof, one is making a subjective
value judgment that one of the separate and distinct values is more important
than the other. 2" Such an approach presupposes the very fairness which is
at issue2O and places a presumption in favor of the humanitarian set of
values over the value of fair dealing. Thus, the selection of a standard of
proof reflects an ultimate societal decision. By selecting a clear and con-
vincing standard a court would be asserting that society's humanitarian
justification of discharge outweighs an individual creditor's right to com-
mutative justice. Under the moral justification for the financial rehabilitation
262. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 69 (1933) (stating that
Bankruptcy Act conditions discharge upon applicant's adherence to standards of honesty and
fair dealing); Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202, 207 (1844) (stating that "[it was
proper that Congress [in enacting the 1841 Act] should not relieve from debts which had been
incurred by a violation of good faith, whilst, from other obligations a full discharge to the
same person should be given.").
263. The continued failure of courts to acknowledge the mutual covenant concept which
underlies the moral justification for fresh start creates serious problems in these courts'
analyses. See, e.g., In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 625 (3rd Cir. 1990) (expressing belief that
'fresh start' policy underlying the Code provides no help in determining what Congress
intended regarding standards of proof"), cert. denied sub nom. Braen v. Laganella, 111 S.
Ct. 782 (1991). The fundamental problem might lie in the fact that the continued use of buzz
words such as "fresh start" distort the proper focus. Howard, supra note 20, at 1048.
However, by developing an awareness of the duality of the moral justification, these semantic
difficulties can be overcome.
264. Unless and until courts confront the significant legal issues head-on and discuss the
underlying "whys" and "whats" behind a particular policy, court decision making is relegated
to the subjective whim of the decision maker. See Moore, supra note 53, at 1154-56 (discussing
various ways values do and must enter into legal reasoning and noting that a moral realist
can put aside her personal values in decision making).
265. In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114, 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (suggesting that use of
higher standard of proof presumes honesty of creditor which is very issue in discharge and
dischargeability cases).
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of debtors, the obligation of a debtor to his creditors in terms of fair
dealing is of equal weight and presumptive validity to society's humanitarian
response to a debtor.266 Any other solution is inconsistent with the Grisez-
Firmis approach to the resolution because it would place undue emphasis
on one human good or value to the detriment of another. 7 The rules of
practical reason and values underlying a moral approach to bankruptcy
dictate the lesser standard.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to develop an awareness of the moral justi-
fication for debtor financial relief. America, as it approaches the twenty-
first century, is an enlightened country whose moral fiber has undergone
drastic changes over time, such that on any particular ethical issue con-
fronting the nation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain a fiber of
moral consensus. One notable exception is in the area of social justice and
the insolvent. Historically, this nation has recognized an objective moral
dimension to the bankruptcy process, and Congress continually has enacted
legislation implementing its fresh start policy, which strives to obtain goals
that mirror that moral fiber. This article has shown that this fiber is
composed of two separate but mutually dependent strands of values inter-
twined into a coherent plan of debtor financial relief. The first strand
reflects the humanitarian concerns of the nation by stressing the fundamental
dignity of every individual. This strand acknowledges a nation's awareness
that the basic economic conditions of human well-being are essential to
society's continued existence and are due members of society as inalienable
266. This position is not inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court which have
confined exceptions to discharge to those plainly enumerated. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S.
558, 562 (1915). In Thaw the Court, in discussing the exception to discharge relating to
obtaining property by false pretenses found in the Bankruptcy Act, held that the professional
services of an attorney were not property under that provision and thus, the debt for such
services would be dischargeable. Id. at 561-62. Nor for that matter is the Thaw approach
inconsistent with the approach pronounced by the Supreme Court in Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S.
704 (1878). In construing the 1867 Act by the application of well defined rules of construction,
the Court held that the word "fraud" used in the section of the Act that set forth the classes
of debts which were exempted from the operation of discharge referred to positive fraud, not
constructive fraud. Id. at 709. The Court, continuing by way of dicta, observed that "[a]
different construction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit which pervades the entire
bankruptcy system." Id. A leading commentator cites Neal as additional source material for
the proposition that exception to discharge "should be strictly construed against the objecting
creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor." 3 Cou.mRs oN BAKRnturcy 523.05A (15th
ed. 1988). However, this is not the holding of the Neal case. Furthermore, this position
erroneously would place the values inherent in discharge above the values inherent in the
system of commutative justice.
267. J. Fnnm, NATuRAL LAW, supra note 23, at 127. Finnis notes that the exclusive
attention to one basic value or basic requirement of practical reasonableness and inattention
to others can be considered to be distorted as a result of "uncritical, unintelligent spontaneity"
or perhaps a bias induced by "social practice" or "emotion" that resists the concern to be
reasonable. Id.
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rights. The second strand symbolizes the recognition by a debtor that in
return for such rights he has the duty and obligation to deal fairly with
individual members of the nation. Together these intertwined strands form
the roots of an underlying moral foundation for debtor financial relief.
These strands of mutual covenant signify the greatness of a nation that
rejects economic action as an end in itself, and seeks justification on a
higher plane. On this plane "ft/he dignity of the human person, realized in
community with others, is the criterion against which all aspects of economic
life [including the bankruptcy laws] must be measured.' '26
268. BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 24, at 14 (emphasis in original).
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Addendum
On May 23, 1991, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals in the Owen case 9, holding that a judicial lien could be avoided
notwithstanding Florida's law that defined exempt property to "specifically
excluded property encumbered by judicial liens." 270 Mr. Justice Scalia writing
for the majority asserted that the avoidance power was available for an
interest in property of the debtor that, but for the lien, would be exempt.271
Thus, even though pre-existing judicial liens are an exception to the Florida
homestead exemption, a debtor might be able to circumvent Florida's lien
conservation statute and avoid a pre-existing judicial lien. The case was
remanded to the circuit court to resolve the issue of whether the lien could
be avoided under the facts of the case. 27 The "result" in Owen is consistent
with the moral justification for debtor financial relief. However, the opinion
is devoid of any underlying value discussion.
In resolving the legal issue on remand, however, the appellate court will
be guided by the Court's decision in Farrey v. Sanderfoot27 issued on the
same days as the Owen decision. In Farrey the Court held that the lien
avoidance section required a debtor to have possessed an interest in property
269. Owen v. Owen, 1991 WL 83032, 6 (U.S.). See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying
text (discussing decisions of lower courts).
270. Owen, 1991 WL.
271. The Court observed that the adoption of this approach in the case of state exemptions
would be consonant with the current treatment in the case of federal exemptions. Id. at 4
(stating that approach taken by lower courts in area of federal exemptions is "not whether
the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs
an exemption to which he would be entitled but for the lien itself."). The Court noted that
"the question is whether the lien impairs an 'exemption to which the debtor would been
entitled under subsection (b) [§ 522(b)],' and under subsection (b) [Section 522(b)], exempt
property is determined 'on the date of the filing of the petition, not when the lien fixed."'
Id. at 5 n.6. In his dissent Justice Stevens argued that the issue of whether the debtor would
have been entitled to the exemption is addressed to the state of affairs that existed at the time
the lien attached, not at the time of filing the petition. Id. at 9. Thus, under his analysis, the
debtor could not avoid the lien because at the time the lien attached, the debtor was not
entitled under Florida law to a homestead exemption. Id. at 10.
272. Id. at 6. In order to avoid the lien, the debtor would have to establish that under
Florida law he had an interest in property prior to the fixing of the lien. If he had acquired
the property subject to the lien, or if the lien had attached simultaneously with his acquisition
of the property, the Court observed that it could be argued that the lien did not fix on an
interest of the debtor in property and thus, the lien could not be avoided. This issue was not
addressed by the Court for the reason, that for purposes of its decision, the Court assumed
that the judicial lien in this case fixed on an interest of the debtor in property. Id. at 3. The
subsidiary issue of whether the retroactive application of the homestead exemption in Florida
would be an unconstitutional taking, if the lien was avoided, also was reserved for consideration
by the appellate court. The Court had previously avoided a similar issue by holding that §
522(0 did not apply retroactively to liens that had been perfected before the enactment of the
Code. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81 (1982).
273. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 1991 WL 83070 (U.S.).
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to which the lien attached, before the lien itself attached.274 Mr. Justice
White, writing for the majority, stressed the "purpose" of the lien avoidance
section as reflected in the legislative history,27" but, like Justice Scalia in the
Owen opinion, failed to given any consideration to the values underlying
our present bankruptcy system. Thus, the Court remains sequestered in its
mantle of logic and semantics. Nevertheless, a careful reading of facts in
Farrey276 and the only three cases2" relied upon by Court to support its
decision reveal one common thread-the debtor who was attempting to
avoid the lien had breached the implied covenant of fair dealing inherent
in the moral justification for debtor financial relief.278 Under the Grisez-
Finnis approach this breach justifies the denial of lien avoidance. The
humanitarian response of society in such cases must be tempered by an
274. Justice White, following Judge Posner's dissent in the appellate decision, asserted
that lien avoidance applied only where the judicial lien attached to the debtor's interest at
some point after the debtor had obtained the interest. It is disappointing that the court did
not discuss the possibility of resolving this issue on the basis of an equitable lien as opposed
to a judicial lien. However, the court noted that Farrey did not challenge the lower courts
determination that this was a judicial lien. Id. at 3. Justice Kennedy, concurring, observed
that the decision of the majority was consistent with fairness and common sense. Id. at 8.
However, Justice Kennedy was concerned that artful divorce lawyers could avoid the effects
of the decision and that Congressional action was necessary. Id. See supra notes 218 and 223
for a brief discussion of the appellate court's decision in Farrey.
275. Id. at 6 (explaining that purpose of § 522(f)(1) was "to thwart creditors who, sensing
an impending bankruptcy, rush to court to obtain a judgment to defeat the debtor's exemp-
tions.").
276. In Farrey the divorce decree, which was entered on February 5, 1987, awarded
Sanderfoot (subsequently the debtor) sole title to the former family house and simultaneously
granted his former spouse (Farrey) a lien on the house to secure payments that Sanderfoot
was to make to her. Id. at 2. Sanderfoot never made "the required payments nor complied
with any other order of the state court". Id. Instead, he filed bankruptcy on May 4, ,1987.
Id.
277. In re McCormick, 18 Bankr. 911, 914 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
McCormick v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., 22 Bankr. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that
judgment lien existed on residence held as tenants by entirety by husband and wife and
subsequent transfer by husband to wife of his interest was subject to existing lien); In re
Stephens, 15 Bankr. 485, 486 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1981) (discussing situation in which debtor
transferred property subject to judicial lien to his brother who then reconveyed it back to
debtor subject to lien prior to filing of bankruptcy); In re Scott, 12 Bankr. 613, 618 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1981) (discussing case where property was simultaneously conveyed to debtor
subject to security interest and not judicial lien as result of divorce decree).
278. Two of the cases involved schemes to avoid the effects of divorce decrees. In each
of those cases the decree provided that one spouse kept the family residence, while the other
spouse retained a lien to secure future payments due under the decree. Farrey v. Sanderfoot,
1991 WL 83070, 2 (U.S.); In re Scott, 12 Bankr. at 614. One case involved a fraudulent
scheme to avoid the lien. In re Stephens, 15 Bankr. at 486. The remaining case involved a
scheme to avoid an existing judgment lien on property jointly owned by transferring property
in fee to one of the judgment debtors. In re McCormick, 18 Bankr. at 912. In each of the
four cases there is clearly an attempt by the debtor to treat creditors in a manner that is
inconsistent with the fair dealing covenant, which is one strand of the moral fiber underlying
the system of debtor financial relief. Such action on the part of a debtor justifies the decision
not to permit avoidance of the lien.
1991] THE MORALITY OF DEBTOR RELIEF 577
awareness that a debtor must be accountable for his failure to do com-
mutative justice to his creditors.
The breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing is not in the Owen
case. In Owen the debtor undertook no scheme to avoid the lien. Under
the moral justification for the financial rehabilitation of the debtor, society's
humanitarian response to the debtor in the granting of exemptions is
mutually dependent upon the fair dealing on the part of the debtor with
his creditors. Thus, in deciding the Owen case, the appellate court should
not blindly follow precedent, but should undertake to determine whether
permitting avoidance will advance the underlying values inherent in the
moral justification for debtor financial relief. In doing so the appellate
court should adopt the humanitarian resolution to this case and permit lien
avoidance. Such a decision promotes the mutually dependent strands of
values that underlie the moral justification for debtor financial relief.

